scholarly journals Capability Coordination in Agricultural Products Logistics Service Supply Chain with Revenue-sharing Contract

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 467-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meiling He ◽  
Qifan Hu ◽  
Xiaohui Wu
SAGE Open ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 215824401987053 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaoguang Zhong ◽  
Fangfang Guo ◽  
Zhiqiang Wang ◽  
Huajun Tang

With the rapid development of e-commerce, logistics distribution has become the bottleneck of its development. It is urgent to study how to optimize the cooperation between e-commerce platforms and logistics service providers. Based on Stackelberg game theory, this research first studies the decision making of two-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of the e-commerce mall and the logistics service provider without cooperative distribution, in which decentralization and centralization are analyzed, respectively. Then, it is extended to the decision making of three-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of e-commerce malls, express delivery companies, and terminal distributors. The results show that the profit, sales volume, and logistics service effort of the centralized decision-making system are higher than those of the decentralized decision-making system, regardless of the two-stage or three-stage logistics service supply chain. Therefore, it is vital to formulate a reasonable profit distribution scheme based on revenue-sharing contract to achieve the cooperation among the partners of logistics service supply chain, so as to achieve a win-win situation in which all of their profits increase. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the results, and some issues are proposed for future research.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Xuan Zhao ◽  
Runze Wu

The revenue-sharing contract is one of the most important supply chain coordination contracts; it has been applied in various supply chains. However, studies related to service supply chains with mass customization (MC) are lacking. Considering the equity of benefit distribution between the members of service supply chains, in this paper, we designed two revenue-sharing contracts. The first contract for the maximum equity of a single logistics service integrator (LSI) and single functional logistics service provider (FLSP) in a two-echelon logistics service supply chain was designed by introducing the fair entropy function (“one to one” model). Furthermore, the method is extended to a more complex supply chain, which consists of a single LSI and multiple FLSPs. A new contract was designed not only for considering the equity of an LSI and each FLSP but also for the equity between each FLSP (“one toN” model). The “one to one” model in three-echelon LSSC is also provided. The result exemplifies that, whether in the “one to one” model or “one toN” model, there exists a best interval of customized level when the revenue-sharing coefficient reaches its maximum.


2019 ◽  
Vol 94 (sp1) ◽  
pp. 659
Author(s):  
Ye Yuan ◽  
Songdong Ju ◽  
Yuqing Fan ◽  
Wenliang Bian

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Ying Luo ◽  
Qiang Wei ◽  
Xinyu Gou ◽  
Dai Dai ◽  
Yiran Zhou

The purpose of this study is to explore the design of equity cooperation mechanism in the sharing logistics service supply chain. This study designs a two-echelon logistics service supply chain composed of an urban joint distribution company and N logistics companies. The urban joint distribution company is jointly established by N logistics companies based on specific shares of equity investment. We establish sharing logistics service supply chain models under revenue-sharing or cost-sharing contracts. Revenue-sharing factor or cost-sharing factor is the equity cooperation parameter. When the members of the supply chain choose to cooperate in revenue-sharing or cost-sharing mechanism, not all cooperation scenarios considered in the study can achieve Pareto improvement of the total profit of the supply chain, but at least one situation can achieve Pareto improvement. This study provides feasible solutions for logistics companies to join the sharing logistics service platform and provides a reference for the operation of a joint distribution platform established by logistics companies. New results and managerial insights are derived by the sharing logistics service supply chain with revenue-sharing vs cost-sharing contracts, which enriches the interfaces of the operation of the sharing logistics service supply chain.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1231-1248
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Yan-Ru Chen ◽  
Shi-You He

This paper investigates decisions in a supply chain of fresh agricultural products considering fairness concerns. By considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer, this paper discusses the effect of the manufacturer’s fairness concerns and the retailer’s fairness concerns on the fresh agriculture product supply chain within the framework of Nash bargaining. Meanwhile, a revenue-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain with fairness concerns. The results show that the manufacturer’s behavioral tendency of fairness concerns will reduce their fresh-keeping effort; thereby, the freshness of products and market demand will also decrease. The behavioral tendencies of fairness concerns of both sides reduce the overall effectiveness of the supply chain and adversely affect the stability of the fresh produce supply chain. Both the optimal retail price and the fresh-keeping effort can be achieved while all parties get higher utilities under the revenue-sharing contract in comparison to the case without coordination.


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