Sharing Logistics Service Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing vs. Cost-Sharing Contracts

The purpose of this study is to explore the design of equity cooperation mechanism in the sharing logistics service supply chain. This study designs a two-echelon logistics service supply chain composed of an urban joint distribution company and N logistics companies. The urban joint distribution company is jointly established by N logistics companies based on specific shares of equity investment. We establish sharing logistics service supply chain models under revenue-sharing or cost-sharing contracts. Revenue-sharing factor or cost-sharing factor is the equity cooperation parameter. When the members of the supply chain choose to cooperate in revenue-sharing or cost-sharing mechanism, not all cooperation scenarios considered in the study can achieve Pareto improvement of the total profit of the supply chain, but at least one situation can achieve Pareto improvement. This study provides feasible solutions for logistics companies to join the sharing logistics service platform and provides a reference for the operation of a joint distribution platform established by logistics companies. New results and managerial insights are derived by the sharing logistics service supply chain with revenue-sharing vs cost-sharing contracts, which enriches the interfaces of the operation of the sharing logistics service supply chain.

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Differential Game Analyses of Logistics Service Supply Chain Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

Journal of Applied Mathematics ◽

10.1155/2014/842409 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 2014 ◽

pp. 1-10 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Haifeng Zhao ◽

Bin Lin ◽

Wanqing Mao ◽

Yang Ye

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Differential Game ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Supply Chain Coordination ◽

Coordination Mechanism ◽

Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽

Logistics Service ◽

Service Supply Chain ◽

The Cost ◽

Relationship Of

Cooperation of all the members in a supply chain plays an important role in logistics service. The service integrator can encourage cooperation from service suppliers by sharing their cost during the service, which we assume can increase the sales by accumulating the reputation of the supply chain. A differential game model is established with the logistics service supply chain that consists of one service integrator and one supplier. And we derive the optimal solutions of the Nash equilibrium without cost sharing contract and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the integrator as the leader who partially shares the cost of the efforts of the supplier. The results make the benefits of the cost sharing contract in increasing the profits of both players as well as the whole supply chain explicit, which means that the cost sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism in the long-term relationship of the members in a logistics service supply chain.

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Coordination Analysis of Revenue Sharing in E-Commerce Logistics Service Supply Chain With Cooperative Distribution

SAGE Open ◽

10.1177/2158244019870536 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 9 (3) ◽

pp. 215824401987053 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Yaoguang Zhong ◽

Fangfang Guo ◽

Zhiqiang Wang ◽

Huajun Tang

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Supply Chains ◽

Revenue Sharing ◽

Two Stage ◽

Logistics Service ◽

Service Supply Chain ◽

Decentralized Decision Making ◽

Decision Making System ◽

Service Supply Chains

With the rapid development of e-commerce, logistics distribution has become the bottleneck of its development. It is urgent to study how to optimize the cooperation between e-commerce platforms and logistics service providers. Based on Stackelberg game theory, this research first studies the decision making of two-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of the e-commerce mall and the logistics service provider without cooperative distribution, in which decentralization and centralization are analyzed, respectively. Then, it is extended to the decision making of three-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of e-commerce malls, express delivery companies, and terminal distributors. The results show that the profit, sales volume, and logistics service effort of the centralized decision-making system are higher than those of the decentralized decision-making system, regardless of the two-stage or three-stage logistics service supply chain. Therefore, it is vital to formulate a reasonable profit distribution scheme based on revenue-sharing contract to achieve the cooperation among the partners of logistics service supply chain, so as to achieve a win-win situation in which all of their profits increase. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the results, and some issues are proposed for future research.

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Deterministic approach to the fairest revenue-sharing coefficient in logistics service supply chain under the stochastic demand condition

Computers & Industrial Engineering ◽

10.1016/j.cie.2013.06.008 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 66 (1) ◽

pp. 41-52 ◽

Cited By ~ 18

Author(s):

Wei-hua Liu ◽

Xue-cai Xu ◽

Ahmad Kouhpaenejad

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Stochastic Demand ◽

Revenue Sharing ◽

Deterministic Approach ◽

Logistics Service ◽

Service Supply Chain ◽

Demand Condition

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Research on Coordination Complexity of E-Commerce Logistics Service Supply Chain

Complexity ◽

10.1155/2020/7031543 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2020 ◽

pp. 1-21

Author(s):

Yaoguang Zhong ◽

Fangfang Guo ◽

Huajun Tang ◽

Xumei Chen

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Global Optimum ◽

Decision Makers ◽

Coordination Strategies ◽

Logistics Service ◽

Business Logistics ◽

Service Supply Chain ◽

Last Mile

With the rapid growth of E-commerce business, logistics service, especially the last-mile distribution, has become one bottleneck, which leads to the rise of coordination complexity of logistics service supply chain (LSSC). This research, based on Stackelberg’s game theory, studies the coordination of a new three-echelon LSSC consisting of an E-commerce mall, an express company, and a terminal distribution service provider and investigates the optimal solutions and profits for each party within the semicentralized and centralized LSSC alliances, respectively. To accomplish this, it firstly shows that the three-echelon LSSC can lead to global optimum under the centralized decision-making scenario and then deploys the contract coordination schemes, including revenue sharing, cost sharing, and unit delivery price contracts, in three semicentralized alliances, so as to achieve the same performance of the centralized decision-making scenario, in which each party in the LSSC can achieve the win-win situation. Finally, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the feasibility and the effectiveness of the proposed coordination strategies. This study enriches the coordination theory in the field of LSSC and provides managerial insights for decision makers in LSSC.

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