scholarly journals Revenue-Sharing Contract Models for Logistics Service Supply Chains with Mass Customization Service

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Xuan Zhao ◽  
Runze Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Mass Customization ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
One To One ◽  
The One ◽  
Service Supply Chains

The revenue-sharing contract is one of the most important supply chain coordination contracts; it has been applied in various supply chains. However, studies related to service supply chains with mass customization (MC) are lacking. Considering the equity of benefit distribution between the members of service supply chains, in this paper, we designed two revenue-sharing contracts. The first contract for the maximum equity of a single logistics service integrator (LSI) and single functional logistics service provider (FLSP) in a two-echelon logistics service supply chain was designed by introducing the fair entropy function (“one to one” model). Furthermore, the method is extended to a more complex supply chain, which consists of a single LSI and multiple FLSPs. A new contract was designed not only for considering the equity of an LSI and each FLSP but also for the equity between each FLSP (“one toN” model). The “one to one” model in three-echelon LSSC is also provided. The result exemplifies that, whether in the “one to one” model or “one toN” model, there exists a best interval of customized level when the revenue-sharing coefficient reaches its maximum.

scholarly journals Coordination Analysis of Revenue Sharing in E-Commerce Logistics Service Supply Chain With Cooperative Distribution

SAGE Open ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 215824401987053 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaoguang Zhong ◽  
Fangfang Guo ◽  
Zhiqiang Wang ◽  
Huajun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Decision Making System ◽  
Service Supply Chains

With the rapid development of e-commerce, logistics distribution has become the bottleneck of its development. It is urgent to study how to optimize the cooperation between e-commerce platforms and logistics service providers. Based on Stackelberg game theory, this research first studies the decision making of two-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of the e-commerce mall and the logistics service provider without cooperative distribution, in which decentralization and centralization are analyzed, respectively. Then, it is extended to the decision making of three-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of e-commerce malls, express delivery companies, and terminal distributors. The results show that the profit, sales volume, and logistics service effort of the centralized decision-making system are higher than those of the decentralized decision-making system, regardless of the two-stage or three-stage logistics service supply chain. Therefore, it is vital to formulate a reasonable profit distribution scheme based on revenue-sharing contract to achieve the cooperation among the partners of logistics service supply chain, so as to achieve a win-win situation in which all of their profits increase. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the results, and some issues are proposed for future research.

Supply Chain Coordination through a Revenue-Sharing Contract with Two Kinds of Fuzzy Demand

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junyan Wang ◽  
Yuan Ren
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Fuzzy Variable ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Uncertain Environments ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Fuzzy Demand ◽  
The One

Revenue-sharing contract is used in many industries. However, it is hard to guarantee that the retailer report the sales truly to the supplier. In fact, the retailer has both incentive and opportunity to underreport the sales to reduce the sharing revenue to the supplier. What the supplier should do when meeting with the opportunistic retailer(s)? This paper studies a kind of opportunistic phenomenon in a supply chain in which a supplier sells to a retailer under a revenue-sharing contract. Two settings are discussed. The first one is that the retailer does not, or cannot underreport the sales to the supplier to share when the supplier design a strict auditing mechanism under which no lies allowed. The second one is that the retailer can underreport the sales to the supplier to share under another soft auditing mechanism. Due to the uncertainty of market demand, it is characterized by a fuzzy variable. Interestingly, we find that the supplier's profit is higher in the second setting than the one in the first setting. We hope that the conclusion drawn in the paper can provide a new viewpoint to help the supplier to solve the problem when meeting with an opportunistic retailer in a supply chain under a revenue-sharing contract in uncertain environments.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Sambhu Das ◽  
Manjusri Basu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Time Price

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals Three-level supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products in the Internet of Things

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (9) ◽  
pp. 1842-1865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Xiao-hua Wu ◽  
Bing Ye ◽  
Yong-wang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Internet Of Things

Purpose The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in the fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain, which can be coordinated through a revenue-sharing contract. The purpose of this paper is to make the three-level supply chain coordinate in IoT by considering the influence of FAP on market demand and costs of controlling freshness on the road. Design/methodology/approach A three-level FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT is regarded as the research object. This study improves the revenue-sharing contract, determines the optimal solution when the supply chain achieves maximum profit in three types of decision-making situations, and develops the profit distribution model based on the improved revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Findings The improved revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT, as well as benefit all enterprises in the supply chain. Practical implications Resource utilization rate can be improved after coordinating the entire supply chain. Moreover, loss in the circulation process is reduced, and the circulation efficiency of FAPs is improved because of the application of IoT. The validity of the model is verified through a case analysis. Originality/value This study is different from other research in terms of the combination of supply chain coordination, FAPs, and radio frequency identification application in IoT.

scholarly journals Three-Level Supply Chain Coordination under Disruptions Based on Revenue-Sharing Contract with Price Dependent Demand

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinghua Pang ◽  
Yuer Chen ◽  
Yulu Hu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Normal Environment ◽  
Contract Form ◽  
Additive Form ◽  
Dependent Demand

Considering the market demand is stochastic and dependent on price, this paper shows that the revenue-sharing contract could coordinate a three-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one distributor, and one retailer under normal environment. However, the original revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain under disruptions in circumstances of certain incidents leading to significant changes in market demand and causing additional deviation costs. To solve the problem, this essay introduces two improved forms of revenue-sharing contract: a mixed contract form based on a quantity discount policy and a pure form, which are characterized by antidisruption ability. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized when the market demand is in the additive form or in the multiplicative form with price dependent demand. Formulas are given to calculate the optimal contract parameters. Finally, this essay demonstrates the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract with the help of numerical examples.

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