Human Rights Law Applicable to Armed Forces: A Conceptual Overview

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-103
Author(s):  
Ivneet Walia ◽  
◽  
Renuka Soni ◽  
Author(s):  
De Wet Erika

This chapter discusses the question of whether third states are prohibited from sending their armed forces to requesting states implicated in widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. Article 3 of the Resolution on Military Assistance by Request of the Institut de Droit International (IDI) 2011 has stimulated the debate, in as far as it claims that the ‘sending of armed forces by one state to another state upon the latter’s request’ is prohibited if it is in violation of ‘generally accepted standards of human rights’. This statement may be read in various ways. First, it can be understood as meaning that the troops of the intervening (assisting) state themselves must adhere to international human rights standards when exercising force at the request of the territorial (recipient) state. However, article 3 of the IDI 2011 Resolution could also be interpreted as prohibiting direct military assistance that would result in the aiding or assisting of human rights violations by the recipient state. The chapter then considers the incurrence and consequences of derivative state responsibility of an intervening state under customary international law for the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law of the territorial state. In so doing, the analysis is informed by case law and doctrine relating to derivative responsibility for such violations through conduct stopping short of direct military support.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

Derogations have been cited as some as a panacea to resolve the unwelcome encroachment, as they see it, of human rights law into armed conflict. This chapter challenges this assertion by analysing the issue with reference to how derogations take effect in respect of a state’s substantive and procedural right to life obligations. The chapter concludes that while derogations may help resolve the tension between international humanitarian law and human rights law in this area by affording primacy to international humanitarian law, they do not prevent all right to life-based litigation founded on the activities of armed forces during an extraterritorial armed conflict.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (04) ◽  
pp. 943-976
Author(s):  
Cóman Kenny ◽  
Yvonne McDermott

AbstractDoes international law govern how States and armed groups treat their own forces? Do serious violations of the laws of war and human rights law that would otherwise constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity fall squarely outside the scope of international criminal law when committed against fellow members of the same armed forces? Orthodoxy considered that such forces were protected only under relevant domestic criminal law and/or human rights law. However, landmark decisions issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) suggest that crimes committed against members of the same armed forces are not automatically excluded from the scope of international criminal law. This article argues that, while there are some anomalies and gaps in the reasoning of both courts, there is a common overarching approach under which crimes by a member of an armed group against a person from the same forces can be prosecuted under international law. Starting from an assessment of the specific situation of the victim, this article conducts an in-depth analysis of the concepts of ‘hors de combat’ and ‘allegiance’ for war crimes and that of the ‘lawful target’ for crimes against humanity, providing an interpretative framework for the future prosecution of such crimes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-158
Author(s):  
Maurice Taonezvi Vambe

The Constitution of Zimbabwe states that citizens who have reached the age of 18 years may vote in local and national elections. However, the Electoral Act states that only Zimbabwean citizens who are on diplomatic missions, civil servants and members of the armed forces on external missions may vote from abroad. This legal requirement effectively disenfranchises millions of Zimbabwean citizens who live and work in other countries. Why the current Zimbabwean authorities do not allow or enable their citizens to vote from abroad in Zimbabwe’s national elections is contentious, especially ahead of the 2023 general elections. This article uses the desktop approach to argue that the right to vote in one’s country of origin by citizens working and living abroad is a barometer of a nation’s deepening democratic practices, of which elections are a lynchpin. This study hopes to contribute to international human rights law. A study of voting from abroad contributes to discussions regarding the evolving and multifaceted relationship between sending states and their diaspora communities.


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