4 Direct Military Assistance to Incumbent Governments Implicated in Violations of International Humanitarian and/or Human Rights Law

Author(s):  
De Wet Erika

This chapter discusses the question of whether third states are prohibited from sending their armed forces to requesting states implicated in widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. Article 3 of the Resolution on Military Assistance by Request of the Institut de Droit International (IDI) 2011 has stimulated the debate, in as far as it claims that the ‘sending of armed forces by one state to another state upon the latter’s request’ is prohibited if it is in violation of ‘generally accepted standards of human rights’. This statement may be read in various ways. First, it can be understood as meaning that the troops of the intervening (assisting) state themselves must adhere to international human rights standards when exercising force at the request of the territorial (recipient) state. However, article 3 of the IDI 2011 Resolution could also be interpreted as prohibiting direct military assistance that would result in the aiding or assisting of human rights violations by the recipient state. The chapter then considers the incurrence and consequences of derivative state responsibility of an intervening state under customary international law for the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law of the territorial state. In so doing, the analysis is informed by case law and doctrine relating to derivative responsibility for such violations through conduct stopping short of direct military support.

Author(s):  
Phillip Drew

The years since the beginning of the twenty-first century have seen a significant incursion of international human rights law into the domain that had previously been the within the exclusive purview of international humanitarian law. The expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly by the European Court of Human Rights, means that for many states, the exercise of physical power and control over an individual outside their territory may engage the jurisdiction of human rights obligations. Understanding the expansive tendencies of certain human rights tribunals, and the apparent disdain they have for any ambiguity respecting human rights, it is offered that the uncertain nature of the law surrounding humanitarian relief during blockades could leave blockading forces vulnerable to legal challenge under human rights legislation, particularly in cases in which starvation occurs as a result of a blockade.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
PIETRO SULLO

AbstractThis article discusses the Rwandan Law 18/2008 on genocide ideology in the light of international human rights standards. In order to put the genocide ideology law into context, it sketches a brief overview of the post-genocide scenario. Because of the influence that provisions restricting freedom of expression aimed at fighting negationism might exert on testimonies during genocide trials, it pays particular attention to the transitional justice strategies adopted in Rwanda. Finally, it assesses the law on the genocide ideology against the background provided by the measures implemented in some European countries to deal with the phenomenon of negationism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyassu Gayim

Laws regulate conducts by responding to social and political requirements. This holds true for the law of nations as well. Contemporary international law follows two separate tracks when it comes to regulating human rights and humanitarian questions. If international human rights law and international humanitarian law are intended to protect the dignity and worth of human beings, as it is often said, why follow separate tracks? Does humanity really exist? If it does, how does it relate to human rights? If the two are distinct, where do they converge? This article highlights these questions by revisiting the contours of international law.


Author(s):  
Féilim Ó hAdhmaill ◽  
Mike Ritchie

International Human Rights Law is supposed to operate at all times. However, during war/conflict it is often suspended to address an ‘emergency’. International Humanitarian Law attempts to deal with human rights protections during the specific circumstances of war. However, what happens when states refuse to recognise a conflict situation as a ‘war’? In a world where violent conflict increasingly involves non-state actors, where does that leave existing international human rights’ mechanisms? This chapter looks at the changing forms of conflict globally and the development of what has been termed ‘terrorism’. It critically assesses the concept of ‘terrorism’ and discusses the difficulties it poses for social science, universal human rights and the development of equality, stability and global peace.


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