scholarly journals How Does Misperception Affect Zero-Determinant Strategies In Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhaoyang Cheng ◽  
Guanpu Chen ◽  
Yiguang Hong
Keyword(s):  
Linear Relationship ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies have attracted wide attention in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) games, since the player equipped with ZD strategies can unilaterally enforce the two players’ expected utilities subjected to a linear relation. On the other hand, uncertainties, which may be caused by misperception, occur in IPD inevitably in practical circumstances. To better understand the situation, we consider the influence of misperception on ZD strategies in IPD, where the two players, player X and player Y , have different cognitions, but player X detects the misperception and it is believed to make ZD strategies by player Y. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the ZD strategies in IPD with misperception, where there is also a linear relationship between players’ utilities in player X’s cognition. Then we explore bounds of players’ expected utility deviation from a linear relationship in player X’s cognition with also improving its own utility.

When Do Psychopathic Traits Affect Cooperative Behavior?: An Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Experimental Study

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Selection Procedure ◽  
Psychopathic Traits ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.

scholarly journals Equipartitioning and balancing points of polygons

Pythagoras ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 0 (71) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shunmugam Pillay ◽  
Poobhalan Pillay
Keyword(s):  
General Theorem ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Centre Of Mass ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

The centre of mass G of a triangle has the property that the rays to the vertices from G sweep out triangles having equal areas. We show that such points, termed equipartitioning points in this paper, need not exist in other polygons. A necessary and sufficient condition for a quadrilateral to have an equipartitioning point is that one of its diagonals bisects the other. The general theorem, namely, necessary and sufficient conditions for equipartitioning points for arbitrary polygons to exist, is also stated and proved. When this happens, they are in general, distinct from the centre of mass. In parallelograms, and only in them, do the two points coincide.

scholarly journals Does imperfect information always disturb the evolution of reciprocity?

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Kurokawa
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Problematic Case ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Explanatory Mechanism ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Reciprocity has long been regarded as a potential explanatory mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation. However, a possible problematic case relevant to the theory of reciprocity evolution arises when the information about an opponent’s behavior is imperfect. Although it has been confirmed that imperfect information disturbs the evolution of reciprocity, this argument is based on the assumption that those who attempt to cooperate always succeed in doing so. In reality, mistakes can occur, and previous studies have demonstrated that this can sway the evolution of reciprocity. In this study, removing the assumption that mistakes do not occur, we examine whether imperfect information disturbs the evolution of reciprocity in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with errors in behavior. It might be expected that when mistakes occur, reciprocity can evolve more in the case of imperfect information than in the case of perfect information. This is because in the former case, reciprocators can miss defections incurred by other reciprocators’ mistakes owing to imperfect information, which allows cooperation to persist. Contrary to this expectation, however, our analysis reveals that imperfect information still disturbs the evolution of reciprocity when mistakes occur. Additionally, we have determined that the condition under which reciprocity evolves remains unaffected, whatever reciprocators subsequently do when the opponent's last behavior was missed.

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