Allies, War Termination, and War Aims.

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph E. Belinski
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
H.E. Goemans

War termination can be defined as the tacit or formal agreement and implementation of decisions to cease fighting on the battlefield. In older literature, scholars focused on the roles of the “winner” and the “loser,” and the endogeneity of the belligerents’ war aims. One group argues that war ends when the “loser” recognizes his position and accedes to the “winner’s” demands. A second group argues that war ends when the combatants agree to a settlement which both prefer over continued fighting. In other words, war is seen as a form of bargaining, where states make rational cost–benefit calculations about war and its termination. These scholars by and large contend that the belligerents’ war aims fluctuate during war, and that the terms of settlement may be very different from the combatants’ original aims. Few studies have highlighted the role of domestic politics. Central in this research is the recognition that the outcome of war and the terms of settlement will affect the domestic political balance of power, and will leave some groups and individuals as domestic political “losers” and others as “winners.” Ikle (1971), for example, argued that the question whether and on what terms to end a war will be particularly difficult to decide for the government that is losing the war. “Hawks”— those who want better terms and favor a continuation of the war—will face off against “Doves,” who would prefer to end the war and are willing to grant more generous terms.


Author(s):  
R. R. Palmer

In April 1792, France had declared war on the “King of Hungary and Bohemia,” that is the House of Austria or Hapsburg, which, since it possessed most of Belgium, was the most important of the powers that adjoined the French frontiers. By the following summer the French were also at war with the kingdoms of Prussia and Sardinia, and by 1793 with Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, and the Bourbon Monarchy of Spain. Despite occasional appearances, or stated war aims, the war that began in April 1792 became an ideological conflict between new and old—between “democratic” and “aristocratic” forms of society in the sense explained in the preceding volume. This chapter focuses on this complex story and nations involved. It begins with a tale of two cities, involving ceremonial events in Frankfurt and Paris on July 14, 1792. It was, of course, Bastille Day, but it was also the date of the imperial coronation of Francis II, a young man of twenty-four who proved to be the last Holy Roman Emperor.


Author(s):  
Eric Patterson

Scholars and political leaders have recently grown increasingly uncomfortable with terms like victory and ‘unconditional surrender’. One reason for this becomes clear when reconsidering the concept of ‘victory’ in terms of ethics and policy in times of war. The just war tradition emphasizes limits and restraint in the conduct of war but also highlights state agency, the rule of law, and appropriate war aims in its historic tenets of right authority, just cause, and right intention. Indeed, the establishment of order and justice are legitimate war aims. Should we not also consider them exemplars, or markers, of just victory? This chapter discusses debates over how conflicts end that have made ‘victory’ problematic and evaluates how just war principles—including jus post bellum principles—help define a moral post-conflict situation that is not just peace, but may perhaps be called ‘victory’ as well.


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