Chapter 6 argues that we can come closer to consensus in the judicial selection debate by confronting and overcoming the errors and exaggerations that chapter 5 isolates. That said, complete consensus is likely to remain elusive because ultimately, judicial independence from electoral accountability is both in tension with and essential to democracy. As the chapter discusses, appointive systems are a preferable default, but there are circumstances in which electoral accountability can be essential to the judiciary’s perceived legitimacy with the general public. The chapter also suggests ways in which elected judiciaries can be made more impartial and independent, including reforming campaign finance, amending disqualification rules, and lengthening judicial terms, as well as greater accountability, as well as the ways that appointed judiciaries can be made more accountable via publicizing existing accountability-promoting mechanisms, reinvigorating disqualification procedure, and instituting rigorous judicial performance evaluations.
Implicit Bias in Judicial Performance Evaluations: We Must Do Better Than This
