Hidden depths: diversity, difference and the High Court of Australia

There is a growing international emphasis on the importance of diversity in the judiciary and the impact of the individual in decision-making. However, it can be a challenge to gain insight into the individuals who sit on the bench. For instance, there is limited official information about the individuals who sit on the High Court of Australia. One of the rare glimpses provided by the justices themselves is their judicial swearing-in speech. Drawing on a case-study of the swearing-in speeches of High Court justices sitting between 2008 and 2016, this paper illustrates how these speeches can illuminate key demographic information about the judiciary, as well as facets of the individual rarely explored in studies of judicial diversity: personality and values. This study demonstrates how swearing-in speeches can assist with filling information gaps about judicial diversity, and so extend debates about judicial selection.

Mixed Judicial Selection and Constitutional Review: Evidence from Spain

Spanish Constitutional Court – Judicial behaviour – Mixed judicial selection – Empirical testing – Decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court, 1980-2018 – Judicial background – Government – Senate – Congress – Spanish Judicial Council – Invalidation of statutes –Dissent opinions – Shaping politicisation.

Judicial Independence and Impartiality

This chapter focuses on national and international concepts of judicial independence and impartiality. As the Bologna and Milan Global Code of Judicial Ethics (2015) makes clear, judicial independence requires that Judges be independent of the legislative and executive branches of the government. Clearly, international Judges must be entirely independent of both governments and international organizations in the performance of their judicial duties. And they must be impartial and avoid any conduct which might give an appearance of partiality; they must not sit on any case where there is a reasonable suspicion or appearance of partiality, and must treat the parties equally, with no partiality or prejudice, with no fear or favor. In international criminal tribunals, this requires treating equally the prosecution and the accused. The chapter then discusses judicial selection, judicial assignments, Court Presidents and judicial bias.

Constitutional Reform and the Gender Diversification of Peak Courts

Do the processes states use to select judges for peak courts influence gender diversity? Scholars have debated whether concentrating appointment power in a single individual or diffusing appointment power across many individuals best promotes gender diversification. Others have claimed that the precise structure of the process matters less than fundamental changes in the process. We clarify these theoretical mechanisms, derive testable implications concerning the appointment of the first woman to a state’s highest court, and then develop a matched-pair research design within a Rosenbaum permutation approach to observational studies. Using a global sample beginning in 1970, we find that constitutional change to the judicial selection process decreases the time until the appointment of the first woman justice. These results reflect claims that point to institutional disruptions as critical drivers of gender diversity on important political posts.