Google, Inc. v. Oracle America, Inc., United States Supreme Court No. 14-410, Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Grant of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Author(s):  
Pamela Samuelson
2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 729-750
Author(s):  
Samuel Reger

Currently, the United States Supreme Court requires a fact-specific approach to determine whether a patent claim is eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, even though, traditionally, this has been considered a question of law. However, recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit introduced the “manifestly evident” standard. The court held that when it is not manifestly evident that a claim is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, then that claim must be deemed patent-eligible subject matter. This Comment suggests that the manifestly evident standard, or one similar to it, will reduce litigation costs. This is because, under the current fact-specific requirements, it may become commonplace for courts to engage in formal claim construction, a costly pre-trial process, to decide whether these requirements are met. But under the manifestly evident standard, courts and litigants will be able to quickly move past the often confusing section 101 to the later sections of the Patent Act, which courts are better prepared to confront.


1929 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry B. Hazard

With nationality problems continuing to occupy a prominent place in both international and municipal practice, expressions of opinion of our highest tribunal upon the subject are received with peculiar interest. This is particularly true where the rule announced is one which governs the validity of naturalization judgments. In a recent sweeping naturalization decision which upholds the government’s views at every point, the United States Supreme Court has again stressed the rule that when doubt exists concerning a grant of citizenship, the statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the United States and against the alien. On October 22, 1928, the court handed down its opinion in the case of Anna Marie Maney, Petitioner, v. The United States of America, in which it affirmed, on writ of certiorari, the judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The latter court had directed the cancellation of the applicant’s certificate of naturalization as having been “illegally procured” because of her failure to file, at the prescribed time and in the required manner, the certificate of her arrival in the United States.


2010 ◽  
Vol 132 (06) ◽  
pp. 47-47
Author(s):  
Kirk Teska

This article demonstrates through several examples of misplaced technology and clash between intellectual property laws and freedom of speech. The first example stated in the article is that of an Apple engineer leaving his prototype next-generation iPhone in a bar and it ended up at gizmodo.com—a website devoted to technology. The folks at Gizmodo tore into the iPhone, confirmed its authenticity, and then put photographs of the phone along with a list of its new features on the gizmodo.com site. Apple, rather than suing, at least so far, simply asked for the prototype phone back and Gizmodo complied. Could Apple sue Gizmodo or would First Amendment protect Gizmodo, only depending upon certain different factors and to an extent on the particular court hearing the case. The ultimate authority on the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court, generally loathes limiting free speech for any reason.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Burk

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In re Roslin Institute, rejecting patent claims to mammals cloned from somatic cells, was rendered about a month before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Alice opinion explicitly sets out the standard for determining whether an invention falls within statutory patentable subject matter. Thus one is thus left to wonder what the Roslin opinion might have looked like had it been decided only a few weeks later, after the Alice decision was published, with the benefit of the Supreme Court's further direction on patentable subject matter. In this essay I explore whether in hindsight the Alice standard might have dictated a different outcome in Roslin, suggesting how the two-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Alice might apply to a "products of nature" analysis for cloned mammals. Drawing on that analysis, I then use the Roslin case as a vehicle to highlight certain issues with the Supreme Court's current subject matter jurisprudence as applied to biotechnology. By juxtaposing Dolly with Alice, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court has revivified a number of dormant biotechnology patent problems in the guise of subject matter analysis.


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