scholarly journals Case of Misplaced Technology

2010 ◽  
Vol 132 (06) ◽  
pp. 47-47
Author(s):  
Kirk Teska

This article demonstrates through several examples of misplaced technology and clash between intellectual property laws and freedom of speech. The first example stated in the article is that of an Apple engineer leaving his prototype next-generation iPhone in a bar and it ended up at gizmodo.com—a website devoted to technology. The folks at Gizmodo tore into the iPhone, confirmed its authenticity, and then put photographs of the phone along with a list of its new features on the gizmodo.com site. Apple, rather than suing, at least so far, simply asked for the prototype phone back and Gizmodo complied. Could Apple sue Gizmodo or would First Amendment protect Gizmodo, only depending upon certain different factors and to an extent on the particular court hearing the case. The ultimate authority on the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court, generally loathes limiting free speech for any reason.

Author(s):  
Julie Van Camp

Reno v. ACLU, the 1997 landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court providing sweeping protection to speech on the Internet, is usually discussed in terms of familiar First Amendment issues. Little noticed in the decision is the significance of the ontological assumptions of the justices in their first visit to cyberspace. I analyze the apparent awareness of the Supreme Court of ontological issues and problems with their approaches. I also argue that their current ontological assumptions have left open the door to future suppression of free speech as the technology progresses. Ontology is significant because zoning in the physical world has long been recognized as a way to segregate "adult" entertainment from minors. So far, at least, the justices seem to agree that such zoning is not possible in cyberspace, and therefore that adult zones for certain forms of expression are not possible. But this conclusion is far from settled. The degree of free speech on the Internet in the future will depend on whether or not our ontological understanding of cyberspace supports such zoning or renders it incoherent or impossible.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-223
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Roark

The First Amendment protects one of our most precious rights as citizens of the United States—the freedom of speech. Such protection has withstood the test of time, even safeguarding speech that much of the population would find distasteful. There is one form of speech which cannot be protected: the true threat. However, the definition of what constitutes a "true threat" has expanded since its inception. In the new era of communication—where most users post first and edit later—the First Amendment protection we once possessed has been eroded as more and more speech is considered proscribable as a "true threat." In order to adequately protect both the public at large and our individual right to free speech, courts should analyze a speaker’s subjective intent before labeling speech a "true threat." Though many courts have adopted an objective, reasonable listener test, the U.S. Supreme Court now has the opportunity, in deciding Elonis v. United States, to take a monumental step in protecting the First Amendment right to free speech. By holding that the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a true threat conviction, the Court will restore the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment and repair years of erosion caused by an objective approach.


This chapter describes the fighting-words jurisprudence. It explains why fighting words are unprotected speech. It reviews the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) case in which the United States Supreme Court first excluded fighting words from First Amendment protection. The chapter aims to show that, since fighting words are unprotected speech, school officials can censor such speech outside the schoolhouse gate without violating the First Amendment. However, school officials must establish that the speech qualifies as fighting words – a challenging task.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul Alim

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is an essential part of the Bill of Rights. The amendment prohibits making of any law respecting an establishment of religion, obstructing the free exercise of religion, infringing on the freedom of speech, infringing on the freedom of the press, interfering peoples assembling rights in a peaceful manner or prohibiting the petitioning for a governmental remedy of grievances. The guarantees of this Bill of Rights were subject to the limitation imposed by the free speech and press provisions of the First Amendment to the US Constitution as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court and other courts. The United States and India are the largest democratic country and almost have similar free speech provisions in their Constitutions. This Article is intended to present the free speech provisions of the American and Indian Constitution as a basic fundamental right of human being. It is also to be examined that what is the role of Supreme Court in interpreting the freedom of speech and expression provisions. The study also tries to incorporate the comparison between the looms of both countries as far as freedom of speech is disturbed.


This chapter discusses child pornography speech which the United States Supreme Court first categorically excluded from First Amendment protection in New York v. Ferber (1982). The goal of the chapter is to provide an overview of the child-pornography jurisprudence. The chapter also highlights a case applying the Supreme Court precedent on child pornography to student speech. The chapter concludes that, due to its unprotected nature, students censored for child pornography speech have no First Amendment recourse.


This chapter discusses obscene speech – a category of speech that the United States Supreme Court has excluded from First Amendment protection. The lack of constitutional protection for obscene speech provides an avenue for school officials to censor such student speech off-campus. The goal of the chapter is to provide an overview of the obscenity jurisprudence. The chapter also discusses examples of cases applying Supreme Court precedent on obscenity to censorship of off-campus student speech.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document