scholarly journals Relationship Banking and Loan Syndicate Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rongbing Huang ◽  
Donghang Zhang ◽  
Yijia Zhao
2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-498
Author(s):  
Rongbing Huang ◽  
Donghang Zhang ◽  
Yijia Eddie Zhao

Author(s):  
David P. Stowell ◽  
Vishwas Setia

Quintiles Transnational Holdings Inc., the largest global provider of biopharmaceutical development and commercial outsourcing services, grew its revenue at a CAGR of 7.3% and EBITDA at 13.9% between 2008 and 2012.The case is set in December 2012–April 2013, when the majority of the firm was owned by founder Dennis Gillings and four private equity firms (Bain Capital, TPG Capital, 3i Capital and Temasek Life Sciences) after it was taken private in a management-led buyout in 2003 and a subsequent buyout in 2008. Five years after the second buyout, the private equity firm owners were looking to monetize their positions and considered different strategic alternatives: M&A sale to strategic or financial buyers, IPO, or capital restructuring through special dividends.Students will step into the role of an associate at the lead investment bank working with Quintiles. They must consider the case information and determine an IPO strategy, process, potential conflicts, and valuation.After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to: Apply valuation techniques (discounted cash flow (DCF) and publicly traded comparables) in pricing an IPO Analyze the roles of different parties involved in the transaction Discuss the process of a company filing for an IPO Evaluate different strategic alternatives available to a private equity—backed company Address conflict of interest in management—led buyouts


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Jacob Swanson ◽  
Mary Fainsod Katzenstein

In recent decades, public prisons and jails have increasingly outsourced operational functions by “turning over the keys” to private business and, more recently and specifically, to private equity. By the early 2000s, private equity-owned corporations had entered the core sectors of prison and jail operations, creating “markets behind bars” in telecommunications, commissary sales, health provision, and a range of other services. Two decades later, they have become a quasi-oligopolistic market force across the carceral economy. Reacting to these developments, scholars and activists have explored how private firms generate profits by extracting resources from families of the incarcerated. Less explored is the fact that it is often and particularly private equity firms that partner with public carceral institutions in these extractive practices. In this reflection, we propose a three-part schematic for understanding how such partnerships, with their attendant predation on the poor and people of color, have become normalized. We focus, first, on the mechanism of bureaucracy through which mutual profit-making by public and private entities becomes regularized; second, we explore the legal mechanisms—the apparently small but potent and politically unexamined legal maneuvers—that enable the redirection of family resources beyond the support of a loved one to the operational needs of jails and prisons; finally, we trace the role of gender as a social mechanism through which private equity and its prison/jail partners rely simultaneously on women’s traditional role as caretaker and non-traditional role as primary breadwinner. We show that all three mechanisms are crucial to the economic functioning of the carceral state.


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