Forward Guidance and Corporate Lending

We suggest that forward guidance, via publicly committing the central bank to future actions and creating associated expectations, fundamentally affects bank lending decisions independently of other forms of monetary policy. To test this hypothesis, we build a forward guidance measure based on the language used in the Federal Open Market Committee meetings and match this measure with syndicated loans. Our results show that expansionary forward guidance decreases corporate loan spreads and that this effect is stronger for well-capitalized banks lending to riskier firms. Forward guidance also affects nonprice lending terms, such as covenants, performance pricing provisions, and the loan syndicate structure. Additionally, banks tend to initiate new lending relationships with lower spreads after forward guidance issuance.

Sustainability of Analyst Recommendations in Multiple Lead Underwriter IPOs

Recently, a new organizational form of syndicate—multiple lead underwriter (MLU) initial public offerings (IPOs)—has emerged in IPOs. In addition to the increased deal complexity, lead underwriters in MLU IPOs face a new competition between them after underwriter selection, which is not present in single lead underwriter (SLU) IPOs. It is therefore questionable whether recommendations by analysts from lead underwriters of the MLU IPOs are as sustainable as those of the SLU IPOs. We examine IPO recommendations to capture how this new syndicate structure affects analyst behavior in terms of analyst optimism and investment value. In contrast to the popular conflict of interest perspective, our findings point to the notion that the new syndicate structure suppresses bias in recommendations and that reputation upholding incentive dominates pressure from competition. MLU-affiliated analysts are not more optimistic and provide more informative research coverage whose informativeness, however, fades away shortly after the recommendation releases. Our findings overall indicate the existence of sustainability in the MLU IPO recommendations.

The Structure and Role of the Underwriting Syndicate

This chapter presents research findings on the structure and role of underwriter syndicates in the initial public offering (IPO) process, thereby extending the list of participants beyond the lead underwriter. The authors rely on recent studies to offer a more comprehensive picture of syndicate structure and size in Europe and the United States. Research questions being addressed include the following: How are underpricing and reputation linked to syndicates? How many banks should be included in the syndicate? What responsibilities can be shared? Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research on IPO syndicate structure.