Convergences of Price Processes Under a Probabilistic Double Auction

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaojing Xu ◽  
Jinpeng Ma ◽  
Xiaoping Xie
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction

Optimizing the Placement of Interconnected R&D Based on Double Auction

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-42
Author(s):  
A. Kozyrev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction

ZIP2 strategy of limited resources under environment of continuous double auction

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (12) ◽  
pp. 3231-3234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-feng CHEN ◽  
Cheng-jian WEI
Keyword(s):  
Limited Resources ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Continuous Double Auction

Multi-unit continuous double auction for resource allocation on computational grid

2009 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 602-605
Author(s):  
Xu ZHAO ◽  
Cheng-jian WEI
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Computational Grid ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Continuous Double Auction

The Alternating Double Auction Market

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market

Computerized Double-Auction Markets: Some Initial Experimental Results

1980 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arlington W. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Results ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Markets

scholarly journals Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Alós-Ferrer ◽  
Johannes Buckenmaier ◽  
Georg Kirchsteiger
Keyword(s):  
Returns To Scale ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Switching Behavior ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Trading Behavior ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Market Institution ◽  
Simple Rules ◽  
Rules Of Thumb ◽  
Constant Returns To Scale

AbstractWhen alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much to trade. We conducted an experiment where traders decided first whether to trade in an (efficient) double-auction institution or in a posted-offers one (favoring sellers), and second how much to trade. When sellers face decreasing returns to scale (increasing production costs), fast coordination on the double-auction occurs, with the posted-offers institution becoming inactive. In contrast, under constant returns to scale, both institutions remain active and coordination is slower. The reason is that sellers trade off higher efficiency in a market with dwindling profits for biased-up profits in a market with vanishing customers. Hence, efficiency alone might not be sufficient to guarantee coordination on a single market institution if the surplus distribution is asymmetric. Trading behavior approaches equilibrium predictions (market clearing) within each institution, but switching behavior across institutions is explained by simple rules of thumb, with buyers chasing low prices and sellers considering both prices and trader ratios.

scholarly journals Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Attanasi ◽  
Kene Boun My ◽  
Andrea Guido ◽  
Mathieu Lefebvre
Keyword(s):  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
Market Experiment
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