Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values

Econometrica ◽

10.3982/ecta16584 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 88 (5) ◽

pp. 2175-2202 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Harry Pei

Keyword(s):

Infinite Sequence ◽

The State ◽

Total Probability ◽

Equilibrium Payoff ◽

Interdependent Values ◽

Strategic Type ◽

Reputation Model ◽

Payoff Functions ◽

Reputation Effects ◽

Bounded Below

A patient player privately observes a persistent state and interacts with an infinite sequence of myopic uninformed players. The patient player is either a strategic type who maximizes his payoff or one of several commitment types who mechanically play the same action in every period. I focus on situations in which the uninformed player's best reply to a commitment action depends on the state and where the total probability of commitment types is sufficiently small. I show that the patient player's equilibrium payoff is bounded below his commitment payoff in some equilibria under some of his payoff functions. This is because he faces a trade‐off between building his reputation for commitment and signaling favorable information about the state. When players' stage‐game payoff functions are monotone‐supermodular, the patient player receives high payoffs in all states and in all equilibria. Under an additional condition on the state distribution, my reputation model yields a unique prediction on the patient player's equilibrium payoff and on‐path behavior.

Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3064949 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Harry Di Pei

Keyword(s):

Interdependent Values ◽

Reputation Effects

Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3266235 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Geyu Yang

Keyword(s):

Reputation Effects

Reputation Effects in Bargaining Games

Southern Economic Journal ◽

10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00233.x ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 66 (1) ◽

pp. 186-192

Author(s):

Eun‐Soo Park

Keyword(s):

Bargaining Games ◽

Reputation Effects

Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '13 ◽

10.1145/2492002.2482606 ◽

2013 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

Tim Roughgarden ◽

Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Keyword(s):

Mechanism Design ◽

Optimal Mechanism ◽

Interdependent Values

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/0002828043052330 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 94 (5) ◽

pp. 1452-1475 ◽

Cited By ~ 327

Author(s):

Lawrence M Ausubel

Keyword(s):

Privacy Preservation ◽

Winner's Curse ◽

Multiple Objects ◽

Vickrey Auction ◽

Treasury Bills ◽

Winner’S Curse ◽

Sealed Bid ◽

Interdependent Values ◽

Private Values ◽

Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

Partnership dissolution with interdependent values

The RAND Journal of Economics ◽

10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00001.x ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 37 (1) ◽

pp. 1-22 ◽

Cited By ~ 44

Author(s):

Philippe Jehiel ◽

Ady Pauzner

Keyword(s):

Interdependent Values

Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values

European Journal of Operational Research ◽

10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 206 (2) ◽

pp. 496-507 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Gadi Fibich ◽

Arieh Gavious

Keyword(s):

Asymmetric Auctions ◽

Revenue Equivalence ◽

Interdependent Values

Reputation Effects

Computational Complexity ◽

10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_163 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 2656-2667

Author(s):

George J. Mailath

Keyword(s):

Reputation Effects

Single object auctions with interdependent values

Economic Annals ◽

10.2298/eka1188125t ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 56 (188) ◽

pp. 125-169

Author(s):

Dejan Trifunovic

Keyword(s):

Single Object ◽

English Auction ◽

Common Value ◽

Reserve Prices ◽

Interdependent Values ◽

Common Value Auctions ◽

Expected Revenue

This paper reviews single object auctions when bidders? values of the object are interdependent. We will see how the auction forms could be ranked in terms of expected revenue when signals that bidders have about the value of the object are affiliated. In the discussion that follows we will deal with reserve prices and entry fees. Furthermore we will examine the conditions that have to be met for English auction with asymmetric bidders to allocate the object efficiently. Finally, common value auctions will be considered when all bidders have the same value for the object.