scholarly journals Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 2175-2202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Pei

A patient player privately observes a persistent state and interacts with an infinite sequence of myopic uninformed players. The patient player is either a strategic type who maximizes his payoff or one of several commitment types who mechanically play the same action in every period. I focus on situations in which the uninformed player's best reply to a commitment action depends on the state and where the total probability of commitment types is sufficiently small. I show that the patient player's equilibrium payoff is bounded below his commitment payoff in some equilibria under some of his payoff functions. This is because he faces a trade‐off between building his reputation for commitment and signaling favorable information about the state. When players' stage‐game payoff functions are monotone‐supermodular, the patient player receives high payoffs in all states and in all equilibria. Under an additional condition on the state distribution, my reputation model yields a unique prediction on the patient player's equilibrium payoff and on‐path behavior.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Qiliang Wang ◽  
Qingquan Jiang ◽  
Hongxia Yu ◽  
Rong Fu ◽  
Changwei Mo

Knowledge sharing between enterprises is an important way to obtain external research and development (R&D) resources and keep competitiveness. This paper used a reputation model based on a two-period signal game to explore knowledge-sharing micromechanism between enterprises and key influencing factors of enterprises. The results show that reputation effects are an important mechanism that will make knowledge sharing between enterprises operate effectively. Motivated by reputation effects, even those noncooperative enterprises continue to pretend to be cooperative enterprises for knowledge sharing before the end of the game. Finally, we adopt the analytical methods and conclusions given by the model in this article to analyze opportunistic problems in knowledge sharing among cooperative enterprises and put forward some valuable suggestions on the conditions for the effective use of corporate reputation effects.


Author(s):  
R. W. Ditchburn

In a paper by Slater a new theory of radiation is discussed and the following explanation of the breadths of spectral lines is given: “An atom in the ith. state has a probability Pi of suffering in unit time a transition. Thus there is a probability Pi that the vibrations of each of the oscillators will simultaneously cease. But we shall assume that, in addition to this probability Pi of ceasing its oscillation altogether, each oscillator has also an independent probability Pj of suffering an interruption in which it ceases its oscillation as if it were leaving the state, but immediately begins again as if it were entering the same state” (i.e. with an arbitrary phase difference). “This term Pj is the same as the probability that an atom in the jth state will leave that state.” The total probability of interruption of vibration is thus (Pi + Pj) which is symmetrical with regard to the two end states. This makes the breadths of absorption and emission lines equal and so satisfies Kirchhoff's law.


Author(s):  
Phillip Kaye ◽  
Raymond Laflamme ◽  
Michele Mosca

In this chapter we will describe some of the early quantum algorithms. These algorithms are simple and illustrate the main ingredients behind the more useful and powerful quantum algorithms we describe in the subsequent chapters. Since quantum algorithms share some features with classical probabilistic algorithms, we will start with a comparison of the two algorithmic paradigms. Classical probabilistic algorithms were introduced in Chapter 1. In this section we will see how quantum computation can be viewed as a generalization of probabilistic computation. We begin by considering a simple probabilistic computation. Figure 6.1 illustrates the first two steps of such a computation on a register that can be in one of the four states, labelled by the integers 0, 1, 2, and 3. Initially the register is in the state 0. After the first step of the computation, the register is in the state j with probability p0,j . For example, the probability that the computation is in state 2 after the first step is p0,2. In the second step of the computation, the register goes from state j to state k with probability qj,k. For example, in the second step the computation proceeds from state 2 to state 3 with probability q2,3. Suppose we want to find the total probability that the computation ends up in state 3 after the second step. This is calculated by first determining the probability associated with each computation ‘path’ that could end up at the state 3, and then by adding the probabilities for all such paths. There are four computation paths that can leave the computation in state 3 after the first step. The computation can proceed from state 0 to state j and then from state j to state 3, for any of the four j ∊ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The probability associated with any one of these paths is obtained by multiplying the probability p0,j of the transition from state 0 to state j, with the probability qj,3 of the transition from state j to state 3.


Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 1697-1723
Author(s):  
Eduardo Faingold

Equilibrium payoff bounds from reputation effects are derived for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which a long‐run player interacts frequently with a population of short‐run players and the monitoring technology scales with the length of the period of interaction. The bounds depend on the monitoring technology through the flow of information, a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on relative entropy. Examples are shown where, under complete information, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long‐run player converges, as the period length tends to zero, to the set of static equilibrium payoffs, whereas when the game is perturbed by a small ex ante probability on commitment types, reputation effects remain powerful in the high‐frequency limit.


Author(s):  
T. A. Welton

Various authors have emphasized the spatial information resident in an electron micrograph taken with adequately coherent radiation. In view of the completion of at least one such instrument, this opportunity is taken to summarize the state of the art of processing such micrographs. We use the usual symbols for the aberration coefficients, and supplement these with £ and 6 for the transverse coherence length and the fractional energy spread respectively. He also assume a weak, biologically interesting sample, with principal interest lying in the molecular skeleton remaining after obvious hydrogen loss and other radiation damage has occurred.


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