Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geyu Yang
Keyword(s):  
Reputation Effects

Reputation Effects in Bargaining Games

1999 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-192
Author(s):  
Eun‐Soo Park
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Games ◽  
Reputation Effects

Reputation Effects

2012 ◽  
pp. 2656-2667
Author(s):  
George J. Mailath
Keyword(s):  
Reputation Effects

REPUTATION EFFECTS WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING IN LINEAR QUADRATIC MODELS

1993 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN CRIPPS
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Reputation Effects ◽  
Quadratic Models

Reputation Effects

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
George J. Mailath
Keyword(s):  
Reputation Effects

Recruiter political skill and organization reputation effects on job applicant attraction in the recruitment process

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 278-296
Author(s):  
Diane Lawong ◽  
Gerald R. Ferris ◽  
Wayne Hochwarter ◽  
Liam Maher
Keyword(s):  
Political Skill ◽  
Experimental Manipulation ◽  
Work Outcomes ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Multiple Sources ◽  
Recruitment Process ◽  
Applicant Attraction ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Reputation Effects ◽  
Data Collections

Purpose Researchers have identified various recruiter and organization characteristics that individually influence staffing effectiveness. In extending contemporary research, the purpose of this paper is to address a straightforward question unexamined in previous research, namely, does recruiter political skill interact with organization reputation to influence applicant attraction in the recruitment process? Specifically, the authors hypothesized that for recruiters high in political skill, as organization reputation increases, applicant attraction to the organization increases. Alternatively, for recruiters low in political skill, as organization reputation increases, there is no change in applicant attraction to the organization. Design/methodology/approach Three studies were conducted to create the experimental manipulation materials, pilot test them and then conduct tests of the hypotheses. Study 1 created and tested the content validity of the recruiter political skill script. Study 2 reported on the effectiveness of the recruiter political skill experimental manipulation, whereby a male actor was hired to play the part of a recruiter high in political skill and one low in political skill. Finally, Study 3 was the primary hypothesis testing investigation. Findings Results from a 2×2 between-subjects experimental study (N=576) supported the hypotheses. Specifically, high recruiter political skill and favorable organization reputation each demonstrated significant main effects on applicant attraction to the organization. Additionally, the authors hypothesized, and confirmed, a significant organization reputation × recruiter political skill interaction. Specifically, findings demonstrated that increases in organization reputation resulted in increased applicant attraction to the organization for those exposed to a recruiter high in political skill. However, the effect was not for a recruiter low in political skill. Research limitations/implications Despite the single source nature of data collections, the authors took steps to minimize potential biasing factors (e.g. time separation, including affectivity). Future research will benefit from gathering multiple sources of data. In addition, no experimental research to date exists, examining political skill in a laboratory context. This finding has important implications for the growing research base on political skill in organizations. Practical implications First impressions are lasting impressions, and it is very costly to organizations when recruiters lose good candidates due to the failure to make a memorable and favorable impression. This paper supports the use of political skill in the recruitment process and highlights its capability to influence and attract job applicants to organizations successfully. Originality/value Despite its scientific and practical appeal, the causal effects of political skill on important work outcomes in an experimental setting have not been formally investigated. As the first experimental investigation of political skill, the authors can see more clearly and precisely what political skill behaviors of recruiters tend to influence applicant attraction to organizations in the recruitment process.

scholarly journals Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1751-1773 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul J Healy
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Infinite Time ◽  
Time Horizons ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Finite Horizons ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Reputation Effects ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputationbuilding models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and noncooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters. (JEL C72, C73, C78, J41)

scholarly journals Reputation Effects in Social Networks Do Not Promote Cooperation: An Experimental Test of the Raub & Weesie Model

PLoS ONE ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. e0155703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rense Corten ◽  
Stephanie Rosenkranz ◽  
Vincent Buskens ◽  
Karen S. Cook
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Experimental Test ◽  
Reputation Effects

scholarly journals Collective Reputation Effects: An Empirical Appraisal

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Gergaud ◽  
Florine Livat ◽  
Frederic Warzynski
Keyword(s):  
Collective Reputation ◽  
Reputation Effects
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