Asymmetric Discouragement in Asymmetric Contests

EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM IN ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH ENDOGENOUS PRIZES

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198913500059 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 15 (01) ◽

pp. 1350005 ◽

Cited By ~ 13

Author(s):

SHUMEI HIRAI ◽

FERENC SZIDAROVSZKY

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibrium ◽

Existence And Uniqueness ◽

Financial Constraints ◽

Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽

Asymmetric Contests ◽

Uniqueness Of Equilibrium

This paper considers contests in which the efforts of the players determine the value of the prize. Players may have different valuations of the prize and different abilities to convert expenditures to productive efforts. In addition, players may face different financial constraints. This paper presents a proof for the existence and uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium in asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes.

Asymmetric contests with general technologies

Economic Theory ◽

10.1007/s00199-004-0566-5 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 26 (4) ◽

pp. 923-946 ◽

Cited By ~ 177

Author(s):

Richard Cornes ◽

Roger Hartley

Keyword(s):

Asymmetric Contests

Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests

Economics Letters ◽

10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.032 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 151 ◽

pp. 23-27 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Christoph March ◽

Marco Sahm

Keyword(s):

Asymmetric Contests

Asymmetric contests over resources for survival and migration: a field experiment with bluethroats

Animal Behaviour ◽

10.1016/s0003-3472(05)80525-1 ◽

1990 ◽

Vol 40 (3) ◽

pp. 453-461 ◽

Cited By ~ 47

Author(s):

Åke Lindström ◽

Dennis Hasselquist ◽

Staffan Bensch ◽

Mats Grahn

Keyword(s):

Field Experiment ◽

Asymmetric Contests ◽

And Migration

Stability of dynamic asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination ◽

10.1007/s11403-020-00290-6 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Akio Matsumoto ◽

Ferenc Szidarovszky

Keyword(s):

Asymmetric Contests

From social status to emotions: Asymmetric contests predict emotional responses to victory and defeat.

Emotion ◽

10.1037/emo0000839 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

João Carlos Centurion Cabral ◽

Rosa Maria Martins de Almeida

Keyword(s):

Social Status ◽

Emotional Responses ◽

Asymmetric Contests

Asymmetric Contests with Interdependent Preferences

Journal of Industrial Economics and Business ◽

10.22558/jieb.2018.04.31.2.749 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 31 (2) ◽

pp. 749-763

Author(s):

Sung-Hoon PARK

Keyword(s):

Interdependent Preferences ◽

Asymmetric Contests

An experimental investigation of asymmetric contests

International Journal of Industrial Organization ◽

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.01.004 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 27 (5) ◽

pp. 582-591 ◽

Cited By ~ 55

Author(s):

Miguel A. Fonseca

Keyword(s):

Experimental Investigation ◽

Asymmetric Contests

Asymmetric Contests with Head Starts and Nonmonotonic Costs

American Economic Journal Microeconomics ◽

10.1257/mic.6.3.59 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 6 (3) ◽

pp. 59-105 ◽

Cited By ~ 25

Author(s):

Ron Siegel

Keyword(s):

Unique Equilibrium ◽

Technological Differences ◽

Dominated Strategies ◽

Asymmetric Contests ◽

All Pay Auction ◽

Strategic Effects

This paper studies multiprize contests in which players' costs need not be strictly increasing in their performance. Such costs accommodate various types of asymmetries, including head starts. Head starts capture incumbency advantages, prior investments, and technological differences. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly- dominated strategies, and apply it to study multiprize all-pay auctions with head starts. A comparison to the standard all-pay auction shows that the strategic effects of head starts differ substantially from those of differing valuations. (JEL D11, D44)

The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests

The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ◽

10.2202/1935-1704.1613 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

Cited By ~ 26

Author(s):

Zhewei Wang

Keyword(s):

Discriminatory Power ◽

Contest Success Function ◽

Equilibrium Set ◽

Accuracy Level ◽

Success Function ◽

Optimal Accuracy ◽

Asymmetric Contests ◽

The Difference

We interpret the discriminatory power, r, in the Power Contest Success Function (Tullock, 1980) as the contest designer's accuracy level. We look at the cases where two contestants are heterogeneous in ability and construct an equilibrium set for r > 0. We find that if the contestants are sufficiently different in ability, there always exists an optimal accuracy level for the contest designer. Additionally, as the difference in their abilities increases, the optimal accuracy level decreases.