Firm Performance and (Foreign) Debt Financing Before and During the Crisis: Evidence from Firm-Level Data

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mateja Gabrijelcic ◽  
Uros Herman ◽  
Andreja Lenarcic
2014 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 169-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazuma Edamura ◽  
Sho Haneda ◽  
Tomohiko Inui ◽  
Xiaofei Tan ◽  
Yasuyuki Todo

2005 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark S. Klock ◽  
Sattar A. Mansi ◽  
William F. Maxwell

AbstractWe examine the relation between the cost of debt financing and a governance index that contains various antitakeover and shareholder protection provisions. Using firm-level data from the Investors Research Responsibility Center for the period 1990–2000, we find that antitakeover governance provisions lower the cost of debt financing. Segmenting the data into firms with the strongest management rights (strongest antitakeover provisions) and firms with the strongest shareholder rights (weakest antitakeover provisions), we find that strong antitakeover provisions are associated with a lower cost of debt financing while weak antitakeover provisions are associated with a higher cost of debt financing, with a difference of about 34 basis points between the two groups. Overall, the results suggest that antitakeover governance provisions, although not beneficial to stockholders, are viewed favorably in the bond market.


Author(s):  
Christian Beyer

Abstract In this article the effects of cartelization on firms’ efficiency are investigated using the example of an early twentieth century coal-mining cartel in Upper Silesia: the Upper Silesian Coal Convention. Established in 1898, the cartel comprised various types of private, as well as state-owned, mining enterprises. Using a microeconomic dataset based on firm-level data of the Upper Silesian mines, I focus on the cartel’s effect on efficiency. The cartel did not significantly reduce technical efficiency among mines. This finding confirms previous research on cartels’ effects on efficiency.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariann Rigo ◽  
Vincent Vandenberghe ◽  
Fábio Waltenberg

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youssef Benzarti ◽  
Dorian Carloni

This paper evaluates the incidence of a large cut in value-added taxes (VATs) for French sit-down restaurants in 2009. In contrast to previous studies, which only focus on the price effects of VAT reforms, we estimate the effects of the VAT cut on four groups: workers, firm owners, consumers, and suppliers of material goods. Using a difference-in-differences strategy on firm-level data, we find that: firm owners pocketed more than 55 percent of the VAT cut; consumers, sellers of material goods, and employees shared the remaining windfall with consumers benefiting the least; and the employment effects were limited. (JEL H22, H25, L83)


Author(s):  
Trung A Dang ◽  
Randall W Stone

Abstract We find firm-level evidence that US banks receive preferential treatment in countries under IMF conditionality. We rely on investment location decisions to infer firms’ expectations about future profits and find that US firms are approximately 53 percent more likely to acquire financial firms in countries under financial conditionality. IMF programs without financial conditionality and FDI in other sectors serve as placebo tests. Financial conditionality has weak effects on investment decisions by non-US firms, which implies a political-economy interpretation. Firm-level data indicate that the distinctive behavior of US firms is not due to advantages of scale or to a US-firm fixed effect, but to US influence in the IMF. Firms from other major IMF shareholders benefit as well, but the effects are much weaker. The effects are concentrated in the politically relevant firms that have local affiliates, which is consistent with the interpretation that firms lobby for preferential treatment.


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