Learning of Actions in Finitely Repeated Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangbo Song ◽  
Mofei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games

Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games

Top ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-95
Author(s):  
Ignacio García-Jurado ◽  
Natividad Llorca ◽  
Ana Meca ◽  
Manuel A. Pulido ◽  
Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games

scholarly journals Cooperation between Emotional Players

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Lina Andersson
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Stochastic Games ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
States Of Mind ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Infinitely Repeated Games

This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The player transitions between the states of mind as a response to observed actions taken by the other player. The state of mind determines the player’s psychological payoff which together with a material payoff constitutes the player’s utility. In the friendly (hostile) state of mind the player has a positive (negative) concern for other players’ material payoffs. This paper shows how emotions can both facilitate and obstruct cooperation in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. In finitely repeated games a player who cares only for their own material payoffs can have an incentive to manipulate an emotional player into the friendly state of mind. In infinitely repeated games with two emotional players less patience is required to sustain cooperation. However, emotions can also obstruct cooperation if they make the players unwilling to punish each other, or if the players become hostile when punished.

Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
George J. Mailath ◽  
Steven A. Matthews ◽  
Tadashi Sekiguchi
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games ◽  
Public Monitoring

Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
George J. Mailath ◽  
Steven A. Matthews ◽  
Tadashi Sekiguchi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Public Signals ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Public Signal ◽  
Action Profile

We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games

1987 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 197-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. -P. Benoit ◽  
V. Krishna
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games

Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

Econometrica ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Benoit ◽  
Vijay Krishna
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games

scholarly journals Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Weinstein ◽  
Muhamet Yildiz
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games

scholarly journals Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew O. Jackson ◽  
Alison C. Watts
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Social Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games

UNILATERAL COMMITMENTS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES

2000 ◽  
Vol 02 (02n03) ◽  
pp. 129-139
Author(s):  
IGNACIO GARCÍA-JURADO ◽  
LUCIANO MÉNDEZ-NAYA ◽  
FIORAVANTE PATRONE
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games

Finitely Repeated Games

Econometrica ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Benoit ◽  
Vijay Krishna
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Finitely Repeated Games
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