Disentangling Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Evidence from China’s Automobile Insurance Market

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Zhang ◽  
Hua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Automobile Insurance

scholarly journals Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection and Learning in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georges Dionne ◽  
Pierre-Carl Michaud ◽  
Maki Dahchour
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Automobile Insurance

scholarly journals Optimality and Equilibrium In a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Stiglitz ◽  
Jungyoll Yun
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market

scholarly journals Evidence of adverse selection in automobile insurance market: A seemingly unrelated probit modelling

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1330303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noureddine Benlagha ◽  
Imen Karaa ◽  
Caroline Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Automobile Insurance

Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the medigap insurance market

1991 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Wolfe ◽  
John H. Goddeeris
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Wealth Effects

scholarly journals Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Health Insurance Market of Iran

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 581-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
GholamReza Keshavarz Haddad ◽  
Mahdieh Zomorrodi Anbaji
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Health Insurance Market

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHOICE OF TEST FOR FINDING EVIDENCE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Donnelly ◽  
Martin Englund ◽  
Jens Perch Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Insurance Premium ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Automobile Insurance ◽  
Selection Models ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Using Data

AbstractWe put one of the predictions of adverse-selection models to the test, using data from the Danish automobile insurance market: that there is a positive correlation between claims risk and insurance coverage. We can find a statistically significant insurance coverage--risk correlation when coverage is expressed relative to the insurance premium, but not when it is expressed in monetary terms.

scholarly journals An Empirical Analysis on The Moral Hazard in the Korean Automobile Insurance Market

2007 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-161
Author(s):  
김경환 ◽  
김용덕
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Automobile Insurance

scholarly journals Asymmetric Information in Iranian’s Health Insurance Market: Testing of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Farhad Lotfi ◽  
Hassan Abolghasem Gorji ◽  
Ghadir Mahdavi ◽  
Mohammad Hadian
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Health Insurance Market

Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment

2001 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 444-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georges Dionne ◽  
Christian Gouriéroux ◽  
Charles Vanasse
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Automobile Insurance
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