scholarly journals Optimality and Equilibrium In a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Stiglitz ◽  
Jungyoll Yun
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market

Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the medigap insurance market

1991 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Wolfe ◽  
John H. Goddeeris
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Wealth Effects

scholarly journals Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Health Insurance Market of Iran

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 581-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
GholamReza Keshavarz Haddad ◽  
Mahdieh Zomorrodi Anbaji
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Health Insurance Market

scholarly journals Asymmetric Information in Iranian’s Health Insurance Market: Testing of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Farhad Lotfi ◽  
Hassan Abolghasem Gorji ◽  
Ghadir Mahdavi ◽  
Mohammad Hadian
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Health Insurance Market

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Group Insurance Market

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Eling ◽  
Ruo Jia ◽  
Yi Yao
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Group Insurance

Regulatory Adverse Selection in the Life Insurance Market

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias K. Polborn ◽  
Michael Hoy ◽  
Asha Sadanand
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Life Insurance ◽  
Insurance Market
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