THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHOICE OF TEST FOR FINDING EVIDENCE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Donnelly ◽  
Martin Englund ◽  
Jens Perch Nielsen

AbstractWe put one of the predictions of adverse-selection models to the test, using data from the Danish automobile insurance market: that there is a positive correlation between claims risk and insurance coverage. We can find a statistically significant insurance coverage--risk correlation when coverage is expressed relative to the insurance premium, but not when it is expressed in monetary terms.

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 1917-1920

Health insurance acts as an important support system, which protects the health as well as the wealth of people. But health insurance is hardly present in developing countries and in many countries it is totally absent. Presence of asymmetric information among the buyers and sellers makes the insurance market more complicated. Due to which insurance companies finds it is difficult to enter into the insurance market and eventually leads to market failure. To get rid of this problem insurance company increased the price of insurance policies. This has more impact on the poor people as they cannot meet their medical expenses. Adverse selection is the one of issues related to asymmetric information. This paper tries to examine the presence of adverse selection in health insurance market in Assam and about the various factors that influence on decision to buy an insurance policy. Based on primary survey this study used a probit model to analyses the presence of adverse selection in health insurance market. Findings of the study shows that adverse selection is absent in health insurance market but income is found to be an important determinant of insurance coverage. About one third of the population in Assam is living below poverty line and the cost of medical is too higher for the people. So health insurance is necessary in recent time to improve the health status of people in Assam. Therefore government should provide health insurance policies for poor people to improve their health status.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 2053-2063 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. M. Boyer ◽  
C. M. Nyce

Abstract. In this paper we model the cost of providing insurance coverage against natural and man-made hazards. We propose an insurance market model that explains (1) the use of reinsurance to help finance the cost of catastrophic events and (2) the implicit (or explicit) presence of government entities acting as (re)insurers of last resort. Using an economic model, we show how insurance programmes should be designed to cover the losses due to a possible catastrophic natural hazard. Our results show that the optimal structure of a reinsurance programme minimizes the cost of offering insurance protection. We also show how government intervention can reduce the cost of insurance against natural catastrophes and increase policyholders' welfare. Our paper therefore offers public policy implications as to the role and presence of government as an insurer of last resort and the minimum insurance premium necessary to cover the cost of catastrophic events.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document