Can the Federal Budget Process Promote Fiscal Sustainability? Evidence from Synthetic Control Using Lasso

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denvil Duncan ◽  
Justin M. Ross ◽  
John L. Mikesell
Author(s):  
Tammy E. Trimble

This chapter explores differences in federal budget communication associated with the development and passage of the Federal Budget Resolution for Fiscal Years 1999, 2000, and 2001. While theory suggests that party-based differences within budget communication exist, empirical studies have not yet explored the full extent of these differences. The goal of this research is to illustrate the significant party-based differences in the goals and values communicated by the actors within the federal budget process. These findings inform our understanding of how actors within this key governing process communicate. This understanding will better equip public administrators to engage others in dialogue and debate that facilitates agreement and understanding.


MRS Bulletin ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 35-35
Author(s):  
Robert L. Post

The federal budget process is often regarded as an arcane affair, the province of a select group of Washington insiders. This includes the mysteries behind the determination of budgets for R&D on materials. The purpose of this discussion is to demysrify the subject a little. It will focus largely on the role of Congress.A common misconception is that the White House sets the budget for the federal government. What the White House does do is send detailed recommendations to Congress each year in January on what it believes the budget should be. This covers spending, tax policy, and economie predictions (the latter reflected in the anticipated tax revenues). In January 1990, for example, the administration submitted budget recommendations for fiscal year 1991, which began on October 1 and runs until September 30, 1991. These recommendations (with subsequent negociations with the Hill) can be quite influential, but serve primarily as a point of reference, which Congress can gladly accept, or completely ignore, as circumstances and preferences dictate.


Author(s):  
Alexander Bolton

Abstract This article studies how administrations seek to shape the federal workforce through the budget process. I develop a theory of personnel politics in which presidents balance ideological and interest group demands in distributing human resources across the federal government. I argue administrations advantage organizations with which they are ideologically aligned and that agencies with higher levels of union penetration see increased budgeted personnel levels, particularly during Democratic presidencies. Using an original dataset of budgeted personnel levels from fiscal years (FY) 1983–2016 and a series of regression analyses, I find strong support for these hypotheses. I also examine the sensitivity of presidential strategy to congressional preferences, agency professionalization, and leadership politicization, providing insights into how this control strategy interacts with the broader environment. Overall, these results have implications for understanding the political dynamics of human capital and capacity in the federal bureaucracy, the administrative presidency, and the politics of performance in federal agencies.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document