A Pure Practical Reason: Notes on Kant's Practical Strategy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doug Magendanz
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Strategy

Islamic Law and Environmental Ethics: How Jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) Mobilizes Practical Reform

2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willis Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
Practical Strategy ◽  
Diagnostic Capacity ◽  
Normative Change ◽  
Guiding Principles

AbstractWhere some religious environmentalisms deploy traditional concepts according to the practical needs of cosmology, usul al-fiqh (jurisprudence) envisions an alternative practical strategy for Islamic environmental ethics. Jurisprudence governs religious adaptations according to guiding principles designed to conform practical reason to the ongoing discovery of divine will. This article shows how those principles can function as mechanisms for normative change, and reviews their diagnostic capacity for evaluating various uses of Islamic resources.

FILSAFAT RUMAH TANGGA: TELAAH PEMIKIRAN KHAWAJAH NASHIRUDDIN ATH-THUSI

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Itmam Aulia Rakhman
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Mutual Respect ◽  
Complex Society ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Mind

Ath-Thusi uses Aristotle's understanding of the practical reason of the theory of surgery. According to Ath-Thusi, the cause of deviation is anything excessive. Thus, the unbalanced state of the soul is caused by the advantages, disadvantages, or morbidity of the mind. Diversity in a society is a necessity, a household, as the smallest community of a complex society and full of differences, it is certainly necessary to be based on the building of togetherness and mutual respect between one another. This article will describe the creative ideas of Khawajah Nashiruddin Ath-Thusi related to the philosophy of the household in order to answer the present-day problematic of the family.

Neither Humean nor (Fully) Kantian Be

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Educational Ideal

This chapter offers a reply to Stefaan Cuypers’ explication and critique of the views of rationality and critical thinking laid out in the previous chapters and in earlier work (see his “Critical Thinking, Autonomy and Practical Reason,” 2004). While Cuypers’ discussion is praiseworthy in several respects, it (1) mistakenly attributes to those views a Humean conception of (practical) reason, and (2) unsuccessfully argues that the positions articulated and defended in those earlier chapters lack the resources required to defend the basic claim that critical thinking is a fundamental educational ideal. Cuypers’ analysis also raises deep issues about the motivational character of reasons; I briefly address this matter as well.

The Interplay of Intention and Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Pragmatic Theory ◽  
Related Idea ◽  
David Gauthier ◽  
Extended Agency ◽  
Extended Life

In a series of essays—in particular, his 1994 essay “Assure and Threaten”—David Gauthier develops a two-tier pragmatic theory of practical rationality and argues, within that theory, for a distinctive account of the rationality of following through with prior assurances or threats. His discussion suggests that certain kinds of temporally extended agency play a special role in one’s temporally extended life going well. I argue that a related idea about diachronic self-governance helps explain a sense in which an accepted deliberative standard can be self-reinforcing. And this gives us resources to adjust Gauthier’s theory in response to a threat of what Kieran Setiya has called a “fragmentation of practical reason.”

Williams on Practical Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Internalist Account

Bernard Williams’s controversial view about reasons for action is the topic of this essay. The essay explains Williams’s internalist account of reasons for action as an improvement on Donald Davidson’s account. It then corrects Williams’s criticism of externalist accounts of reasons for action by conceding that such accounts are viable as long as they do not imply that the reasons a person has for doing an action can explain his or her doing it. The concession follows from acknowledging the very different program of studying reasons in ethics exemplified in the work of Kurt Baier. Once the correction is made to Williams’s criticism, the essay offers a defense of his view against the criticisms of T. M. Scanlon and Christine Korsgaard.

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