Rationality as the condition of individual rights in David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement

The topic of this paper is the foundation for individual rights proposed by David Gauthier in his seminal 1986 book Morals by Agreement, and particularly the role of conception of rationality in this foundation. The foundation of rights is a part of Gauthier’s broader enterprise: to ground morals in rationality – more specifically, in the economic conception of rationality. Because of the importance of this conception for the whole of Gauthier’s project, we reconstruct first the conception of rationality which can be found in decision theory and game theory, presenting simultaneously in a relatively non-technical way some basic concepts of the aforementioned disciplines. We proceed then to reconstruction of the foundation of rights itself – it turns on Gauthier’s interpretation of the so-called “Lockean proviso.” Lastly, we turn to the connection between rationality and foundation of rights. It is to be found in the narrow compliance – the disposition to enter only into cooperation which satisfies conditions of fairness set out in part by the Lockean proviso.

Justice as Non-maleficence

The principle of non-maleficence, primum non nocere, has deep roots in the history of moral philosophy, being endorsed by John Stuart Mill, W. D. Ross, H. L. A. Hart, Karl Popper and Bernard Gert. And yet, this principle is virtually absent from current debates on social justice. This article suggests that non-maleficence is more than a moral principle; it is also a principle of social justice. Part I looks at the origins of non-maleficence as a principle of ethics, and medical ethics in particular. Part II introduces the idea of non-maleficence as a principle of social justice. Parts III and IV define the principle of justice as non-maleficence in terms of its scope and coherence, while Part V argues that the motivation of not doing harm makes this principle an alternative to two well-established paradigms in the literature on social justice: justice as mutual advantage (David Gauthier) and justice as impartiality (Brian Barry).

OS PRESSUPOSTOS DA INTERPRETAÇÃO ORTODOXA DO LEVIATÃ

O objetivo do presente artigo é demonstrar como a interpretação ortodoxa do Leviatã se baseia em dois pressupostos básicos: 1) que Hobbes defendeu o egoísmo psicológico; 2) que Hobbes defendeu o egoísmo racional. Uma vez que esses pressupostos sejam identificados é possível perceber o seguinte padrão interpretativo nos principais comentadores da sua obra: o estado de natureza como um dilema do prisioneiro da teoria dos jogos; a obrigação política justificada pela razão prudencial; a irrelevância da religião para a teoria moral e política de Hobbes. A fim de demonstrar como a interpretação ortodoxa chegou a essas conclusões, esse artigo está dividido em duas partes. Na primeira parte, apresento os dois pressupostos principais, bem como a interpretação decorrente deles. Na última parte, tomo como exemplo a obra de David Gauthier, A Lógica do Leviatã, para demonstrar que os pressupostos da interpretação ortodoxa foram apresentados primeiramente ali.

The Interplay of Intention and Reason

In a series of essays—in particular, his 1994 essay “Assure and Threaten”—David Gauthier develops a two-tier pragmatic theory of practical rationality and argues, within that theory, for a distinctive account of the rationality of following through with prior assurances or threats. His discussion suggests that certain kinds of temporally extended agency play a special role in one’s temporally extended life going well. I argue that a related idea about diachronic self-governance helps explain a sense in which an accepted deliberative standard can be self-reinforcing. And this gives us resources to adjust Gauthier’s theory in response to a threat of what Kieran Setiya has called a “fragmentation of practical reason.”

On the Scope of Egalitarian Justice

It is not clear whether the social contract is supposed to merely supplement the unequal gains that individuals are able to make through the exercise of their natural endowments with a set of equal gains secured through social cooperation, or whether the social contract must also compensate individuals for the effects of these natural inequalities, so that they literally become all equal. The issue concerns, in effect, whether natural inequality falls within the scope of egalitarian justice. I think it is fair to say that the majority of egalitarians assume that the principle of equality imposes an obligation to redress natural inequality. Yet there is no consensus on this issue. David Gauthier has made the rejection of the principle of redress a central component of his project. It has often escaped notice that John Rawls also rejects the principle of redress. Thus it is not just anti-egalitarians who reject the principle of redress. There is a current of egalitarian thought – which we might call, for lack of a better term, narrow-scope egalitarianism – which also rejects this principle. In this paper, I would like to show that there is considerable wisdom in the narrow-scope egalitarian position. Many of the problems that lead theorists to reject egalitarianism in its entirety are a consequence, not of the principle of equality per se, but rather of the commitment to redress natural inequality. The narrow-scope view avoids all of these difficulties.

The Hobbesian Hypothesis in Contemporary Political Theory

This chapter argues that “the Hobbesian hypothesis” (the claim that the Lockean proviso is fulfilled: everyone is better off in a state society with a private property system than they could reasonably expect to be in any society without either of those institutions) plays a large role in contemporary justifications of the state and/or the property rights system. The search turns up few attempts to justify existing states or property rights systems without some version of the hypothesis. Theorists asserting it as an obvious truth in need of little or no supporting evidence include David Gauthier, Jean Hampton, James Buchanan, Gregory S. Kavka, George Klosko, Dudley Knowles, Christopher Heath Wellman, Robert Nozick, Jan Narveson, and many others. Critics include Alan Ryan, Carole Pateman, Charles Mills, Patricia Williams, and others. Yet all this disagreement has produce very little debate or interest in an empirical investigation of the hypothesis.

Getting the Baseline Right—or—Why I’m Right and Everyone Else is Wrong, in each of the Two Senses of ‘Why’

My fellow contractarians and I are of a mind that it would be irrational to comply with a distribution of the cooperative dividend that worsens one’s condition. But worse than what? According to David Gauthier et al., it’s non-interaction, i.e., what would be the case were the negotiators never to have met. I argue that it’s what would be the case in the absence of their coming to an agreement. As it turns out, this distinction can be, and often is, a matter of life and death.

Contractarianism and Moral Standing Inegalitarianism

Contractarianism is more inclusive than critics (and, indeed, David Gauthier) sometimes suggest. Contractarianism can justify equal moral standing for human persons (in some respects) and provide sufficient moral standing for many nonhuman animals to require what we commonly call ‘decent treatment.’ Moreover, contractarianism may allow that some entities have more moral standing than do others. This does not necessarily license the oppression that liberal egalitarians rightly fear. Instead, it shows that contractarianism may support a nuanced account of moral status.

Social Contract: The Only Game in Town

David Gauthier once said that the social contract offers ‘the only game in town’ if we hope for a rational morality. I argue that he’s correct. Morality consists of rules notionally directed at everyone everywhere. Only individual people are rational, and they have varying interests. The social contract proposes principles that everyone would, in view of their social and environmental circumstances, agree to as constraining their separate pursuits of their ends. There is no other rational way to understand morals, and so it is indeed the only game in town.

Gauthier, Equilibrium, and the Emergence of Morality

David Gauthier develops morality in the social contract tradition as an emergent property rationally necessitated by the presence of inefficiency. To demarcate situations in which morality arises from those in which it does not, two principles, Strategic Emergence and Market Emergence, are motivated and assumed by Gauthier to be equivalent. Following the work of Bob Bright, this paper formalizes and expands upon a demonstration of the inconsistency of the two principles. Eliminating each of the emergence conditions is considered to resolve the inconsistency. Additionally, the Kantian equilibrium is examined in place of the Nash equilibrium; however, Gauthier’s approach resists such amendments.