Squaring the Circle: The Court of Justice, Monetary Policy, and the End of Rational Legal Reasoning

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle ◽  
Esin Kucuk
2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-379 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractIn the Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon case, the Court of Justice was mainly faced with the question of the applicability of the Community law provisions governing free movement of persons in "internal situations" i.e., situations in which EU citizens who are nationals of the host Member States, may not invoke the protection of Community law due to the lack of a cross-border element. The Court resists the call of its AG, but its reply does not give a definitive answer to the situation of those nationals who have exercised, to some extent, their right to free movement. In the Eind case, the Court was confronted with the question whether the third country family member of a national of the host Member State, who has no right of residence in that State, nevertheless enjoys a right of family reunification there upon the return of that national from another Member State where he exercised his right to free movement. The Court answers that question positively, but its legal reasoning is questionable.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-41
Author(s):  
Roman Kwiecień

The paper addresses the issue of a judicial forum entitled to resolve conflicts between European Union law and national constitutional rules. First and foremost, the issue is discussed under the old primacy/supremacy of EU law controversy. The author seeks to answer whether the national law, including constitutional rules, of a Member State can be ineffective owing to being contradictory to EU law. If so, by whom can national laws be held ineffective? In other words, which of the two judicial fora (national and European) have the last word in these conflicts or who is the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of law within the European legal space? The author argues that legal reasoning should reconcile, on the one hand, the specificity of the EU’s unique legal order and effective application of its provisions and, on the other hand, the international legal status of the Member States and their constitutions. This approach leads to the conclusion that there is no ultimate judicial arbiter within the European legal space.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-584
Author(s):  
Vladyslav Lanovoy

AbstractArticle 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice attributes limited legal authority to judicial and arbitral decisions. They are not formal sources of law and are described as only subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. However, the continuing validity of this characterization is challenged not only by the Court’s practice of referring to its own jurisprudence, a phenomenon that has been empirically and theoretically analysed elsewhere, but also its relatively new practice of relying on external case law. This article seeks to draw attention to one aspect of this new practice, namely the marked increase in the Court’s citation of inter-state arbitral awards since the 1990s. It is argued that the Court refers to inter-state arbitral awards in its decisions for three principal reasons – (i) to determine the existence of a given rule, (ii) to supplement its legal reasoning or its own case law on a particular issue, and (iii) to distinguish an arbitral award from the case before it. More ambitiously, the article argues that the way the Court relies on inter-state arbitral awards shows that the Court attributes legal authority to these awards that goes beyond that of a subsidiary means for determining a given rule of law, bringing it closer to what might be qualified as persuasive but non-binding precedent.


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