Dallah: the death knell for deference?

<p>This paper examines the decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Minister of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, a rare case where an English court refused enforcement of an international arbitral award under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). Although in Dallah the United Kingdom Supreme Court acknowledged the trend to limit reconsideration of the findings of arbitral tribunals in fact and in law, the Court considered it was bound to decide the question of validity de novo. Contrary to the tribunal, the Court held the arbitration agreement was not valid under the law to which it was subject and refused enforcement of the arbitral award. This paper analyses how the English Supreme Court decided the legal issues before it. It concludes the English court could have reached the same decision on a more convincing basis. Even where the issue is initial consent, holding the court at the place of enforcement is always bound to decide a matter de novo neither serves the objectives of international commercial arbitration nor is necessary to promote the fundamental integrity of arbitral proceedings.</p>

Dallah: the death knell for deference?

<p>This paper examines the decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Minister of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, a rare case where an English court refused enforcement of an international arbitral award under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). Although in Dallah the United Kingdom Supreme Court acknowledged the trend to limit reconsideration of the findings of arbitral tribunals in fact and in law, the Court considered it was bound to decide the question of validity de novo. Contrary to the tribunal, the Court held the arbitration agreement was not valid under the law to which it was subject and refused enforcement of the arbitral award. This paper analyses how the English Supreme Court decided the legal issues before it. It concludes the English court could have reached the same decision on a more convincing basis. Even where the issue is initial consent, holding the court at the place of enforcement is always bound to decide a matter de novo neither serves the objectives of international commercial arbitration nor is necessary to promote the fundamental integrity of arbitral proceedings.</p>

Arbitral Award of Oct. 3, 1899 (Guy. v. Venez.) (Decision on Jurisdiction) (I.C.J.)

On December 18, 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed down its decision on the jurisdiction of the Court in the case concerning the Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela). By a 14–2 majority, the Court ruled that it has jurisdiction to decide certain elements of the application submitted unilaterally by Guyana against Venezuela, while it concluded unanimously that it lacks jurisdiction over other aspects of Guyana's application. Having established jurisdiction over certain elements of Guyana's application, the ICJ will now proceed to hear the merits of the claims.

Does the Name of a Case Matter?

The arbitral award in The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India) brings to the fore the issue of assigning a name to a case. To contextualise India’s contention regarding the name, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident, in this article, I outline the law and practice regarding assigning names to cases by different international judicial bodies (ICJ, ITLOS, WTO and PCA). Examining India’s objection to the name, I argue that the name of the case does not capture the subject matter of the dispute accurately and emanates from the mainstream view of international law. The name prioritises an Italian flagged vessel, owned by a company engaged in international commerce and navigating under the protection of the Italian navy, over a fishing vessel owned by private individuals. The name reinforces a state-centric view of international law in which the victims of the incident do not picture.

The Enrica Lexie Award Amid Jurisdictional and Law of the Sea Issues

This article analyzes the Enrica Lexie Arbitral Award, first of all, in relation to international law issues concerning the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The article then focuses on the question of the functional immunity of the two marines, from the point of view of the Tribunal’s assertion of its incidental jurisdiction to deal with the matter, as well as of the Tribunal’s affirmation of the existence of a customary international law rule applicable in the present case. Both conclusions appear unconvincing, also in light of the role of the two marines on board a merchant ship. In any case, the fact remains that the judgment has the merit of finally putting an end to a long-standing dispute, to the satisfaction of the two parties involved.

Right of Appeal under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act of Kenya

An arbitral award is final and binding on the parties but may be set aside for failure to adhere to due process requirements. Section 35 of the Arbitration Act (Act hereafter) provides grounds for setting aside an arbitral award. It does not state whether decisions of the High Court on setting aside an arbitral award are final and thus cannot be appealed. In Nyutu Agrovet Limited v Airtel Networks Limited, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 35 to allow appeals on High Court decisions of setting aside an arbitral award. This paper analyses the Supreme Court decision and finds that it abrogated the internationally recognised arbitration principles such as party autonomy, the finality of arbitral awards and limited court intervention. Additionally, the paper discusses the implications of the decision on arbitral practice in Kenya. Using literature review and comparative jurisprudence, it advances that Section 35 does not allow appeals on decisions of the High Court. To this end, it proposes better interpretation techniques to safeguard the sanctity of arbitral awards.

Arbitral Awards Under ISTAC Arbitration

Arbitration is a well-established and widely used method of resolution of disputes outside the state courts. There are various arbitration centers around the world. The Istanbul Arbitration Centre ISTAC is an independent, neutral and impartial institution providing efficient dispute resolution services for both international and domestic parties. The arbitral awards rendered under ISTAC Arbitration Rules are subject to enforcement by officers just as court decisions. ISTAC arbitration proceeding is carried out by The Sole Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal which consist of President and other arbitrators. The Sole Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal shall render the award on the merits of the dispute, within 6 months from the date upon which the completion of the signatures on the terms of reference. When the dispute is resolved by an Arbitral Tribunal, it shall decide by majority. In the absence of majority, the award shall be made by the President of the Arbitral Tribunal. The arbitral award contains information of parties and arbitrators, the reasoning of the award, the decision, the decision concerning the costs of the arbitration. The awards are signed by Sole Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal. The Sole Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal may correct ex officio any computational and typographical errors in the award within 30 days of the date on which the award was rendered. The arbitration proceedings are terminated by the issuance of the award or by the occurrence of any circumstances which are stipulated under ISTAC Arbitration Rules Article 3.

Exploring the concept of arbitral awards under the New York Convention

Despite its importance, the arbitral award was left undefined by the New York Convention and most other major international arbitration laws. This has inevitably led to varying opinions regarding its nature and confusion regarding the thresholds that differentiate arbitral awards from other tribunal decisions. Partly in response to the above, there has been discussion to initiate the revising process of the Convention. Responses have been divided. In this paper, the author finds that revision will not bring the desired results, while the Convention itself has equipped international arbitration practice with tools to overcome obscure legal concepts such as the arbitral award.

Setting Aside Arbitral Awards for Contradicting Public Policy According to the Turkish International Arbitration Act

This study analyses the setting aside of arbitral awards for contradicting public policy according to the Turkish International Arbitration Act. In a setting aside action, the arbitral award is not scrutinized on its merits; rather, only certain grounds are taken into consideration. One ground that judges evaluate on their own motion is being against public policy. We believe that a more international public policy understanding that is in harmony with the needs and requirements of international arbitration should be adopted.