A Multi-Criteria Assessment of Corporate Residual Claimants

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sung Eun Kim
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312110657
Author(s):  
Andrew Young

Scholars have argued that the politically fractured landscape of medieval Western Europe was foundational to the evolution of constitutionalism and rule of law. In making this argument, Salter and Young (2019) have recently emphasized that the constellation of political property rights in the High Middle Ages was polycentric and hierarchical; holders of those rights were residual claimants to the returns on their governance and sovereign. The latter characteristics—residual claimancy and sovereignty—imply a clear delineation of jurisdictional boundaries and their integrity. However, historians’ description of the “feudal anarchy” that followed the tenth-century disintegration of the Carolingian Empire does not suggest clearly delineated and stable boundaries. In this paper, I highlight the role of the Peace of God movement in the 11th and 12th centuries in delineating and stabilizing the structure of political property rights. In terms of historical political economy, the Peace of God movement provides an important link between the early medieval era and the constitutional arrangements of the High Middle Ages.


2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Bernard Yeung

We use a simple real options framework and empirical data to establish that although Japanese banks hold borrowers' shares, their interest is more along the lines of a contractual claimant than a residual claimant of corporations. We then explain why the Japanese model of corporate governance was useful during the “catching-up” growth of that country's postwar reconstruction decades but became problematic subsequently. The interests of shareholders, creditors, workers, and managers are more readily aligned because such growth entails investment in knowntechnology physical-capital-intensive projects with highly predictable cash flows. Once firms are on the technological frontier, “keeping-up” growth requires risk taking and a tolerance for “creative destruction.” This is better accommodated by entrusting corporate governance to firms' true residual claimants, their shareholders.


1975 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T. Boehm

Changing conditions in market organization and competitive nature of the United States dairy industry are signaling a different pricing system for milk and related products. Market conditions and demand patterns which led to adoption of the present pricing system no longer exist. The reservoir of manufacturing grade milk in Minnesota and Wisconsin is continually being depleted, as producers in that area either leave the business or shift to Grade “A” fluid outlets.A changing demand for milk and other dairy products has also contributed to the present need for a reconsideration of the milk pricing process. Per capita consumption of beverage milk has stabilized at about 292 pounds per year. There have been, however, substantial increases in the consumption rate for some manufactured products, especially cheese. Ironically, with somewhat stabilized increases in population growth, future expansion for the dairy industry may rest with the potential for increased consumption of those products traditionally serving as “residual claimants”.


1988 ◽  
Vol 116 ◽  
pp. 592-633 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Walker

The economic and institutional framework against which trends in crop production under the government of Deng Xiaoping must be considered, is vastly different from that which existed throughout the Mao era. In a word, Deng replaced a system of planned production and supply by one in which market demand became the main determinant of the level and structure of agricultural production. Under Mao Zedong, maximizing the physical output of key agricultural products was the basis of agricultural policy. Centrally identified priorities – based on “national need” – were reflected in targets for the output, sown area and yield per hectare of individual items. These mandatory targets were to be fulfilled by the collective farms (the production teams of the communes) which were the basic organizational units of Chinese agriculture. Similarly, the disposal of farm output was determined by the central plan. For production teams, therefore, decision-making was relatively simple and followed the sequence of production, harvesting and procurement, all according to plans laid down by the government. Cost accounting was rudimentary. It was not, in any case, geared to the promotion of “economic efficiency.” If production costs rose-for example, as a result of an increase in the multiple cropping index directed by the government – the peasants bore the burden, as they were the residual claimants in the distribution of income by the production teams.


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