scholarly journals Dominance Solvability in Random Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noga Alon ◽  
Kirill Rudov ◽  
Leeat Yariv
Keyword(s):  
Random Games ◽  
Dominance Solvability

Smart Greedy Distributed Energy Allocation: a Random Games Approach

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Ilai Bistritz ◽  
Andrew Ward ◽  
Zhengyuan Zhou ◽  
Nicholas Bambos
Keyword(s):  
Energy Allocation ◽  
Distributed Energy ◽  
Random Games

scholarly journals Evolutionarily stable strategies of random games, and the vertices of random polygons

2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergiu Hart ◽  
Yosef Rinott ◽  
Benjamin Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Random Polygons ◽  
Random Games ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

On the Support Size of Stable Strategies in Random Games

2007 ◽  
pp. 154-165
Author(s):  
Spyros C. Kontogiannis ◽  
Paul G. Spirakis
Keyword(s):  
Support Size ◽  
Random Games

scholarly journals Assessing the Likelihood of Panic-Based Bank Runs

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Zimper
Keyword(s):  
Unit Interval ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Bank Runs ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
Strategic Complements ◽  
Continuous Type ◽  
Bank Run ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Demand Deposit ◽  
Dominance Solvability

Conditional on the considered equilibrium, the probability of a bank run in the demand-deposit contract models of Bryant (1980) and of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is either one or zero. In contrast, we establish the existence of an interval - being a strict subset of the unit-interval - of possible bank run probabilities for a two-player demand-deposit contract model where players receive independent signals about their liquidity desire from a continuous type space. As our main result we demonstrate that this interval reduces to a unique probability of a panic-based bank strictly smaller than one if and only if there exist types for which not running on the bank is a dominant action. In addition to existing models of bank runs such as, e.g., Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), our approach also provides some assessment of the likelihood of a bank run if there are no types for which not running on the bank is a dominant action. As a consequence, we can investigate the comparative statics of the likelihood of bank runs with respect to a larger range of payoff parameters than considered in previous models. Furthermore, we derive a technical result by which the findings of Morris and Shin (2005) on the dominance-solvability of binary action games with strategic complements also apply to nice games in the sense of Moulin (1984) if players' best response functions are increasing.

scholarly journals Equilibrium points of random generalized games

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-800 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Tarafdar ◽  
Xian-Zhi Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Existence Theorem ◽  
Existence Theorems ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Lower Semicontinuous ◽  
Vector Spaces ◽  
Maximal Elements ◽  
Equilibrium Existence ◽  
Topological Vector Spaces ◽  
Generalized Games ◽  
Random Games

In this paper, the concepts of random maximal elements, random equilibria and random generalized games are described. Secondly by measurable selection theorem, some existence theorems of random maximal elements forLc-majorized correspondences are obtained. Then we prove existence theorems of random equilibria for non-compact one-person random games. Finally, a random equilibrium existence theorem for non-compact random generalized games (resp., random abstract economics) in topological vector spaces and a random equilibrium existence theorem of non-compact random games in locally convex topological vector spaces in which the constraint mappings are lower semicontinuous with countable number of players (resp., agents) are given. Our results are stochastic versions of corresponding results in the recent literatures.

scholarly journals Maximum likelihood equilibria of random games

Optimization ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. E. M. Borm ◽  
R. Cao ◽  
I. García-Jurado
Keyword(s):  
Maximum Likelihood ◽  
Random Games

Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaron Azrieli ◽  
Dan Levin
Keyword(s):  
Dominance Solvability

scholarly journals Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games

2012 ◽  
Vol 160 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 948-958
Author(s):  
Nikolai S. Kukushkin
Keyword(s):  
Finite Games ◽  
Dominance Solvability

Mechanism Design and the Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Güth
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Revelation Principle ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legal Mechanism ◽  
Dominance Solvability

Mechanism design is the game theoretic jargon for institutional design and the even older tradition (in German) of ‘Ordnungspolitik’ (institutional design policy). When implementing institutions or mechanisms (or simply rules of conduct) such regulation should usually be codified by complementing the law appropriately. This article first derives and discusses legal rules as traditionally justified and implemented legally. This is then confronted with game theoretic mechanism design, relying on Dominance Solvability or the Revelation Principle. It is argued that the Revelation Principle is very useful for welfaristic or, more generally, consequentialistic explorations of what is attainable but offers no practical basis for legal mechanism design due to its unrealistic common knowledge restrictions.

Rationalizable strategies in random games

2019 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 110-125
Author(s):  
Ting Pei ◽  
Satoru Takahashi
Keyword(s):  
Random Games
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