scholarly journals Dominance Solvability in Random Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noga Alon ◽  
Kirill Rudov ◽  
Leeat Yariv

Author(s):  
Ilai Bistritz ◽  
Andrew Ward ◽  
Zhengyuan Zhou ◽  
Nicholas Bambos


2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergiu Hart ◽  
Yosef Rinott ◽  
Benjamin Weiss




2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Zimper

Conditional on the considered equilibrium, the probability of a bank run in the demand-deposit contract models of Bryant (1980) and of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is either one or zero. In contrast, we establish the existence of an interval - being a strict subset of the unit-interval - of possible bank run probabilities for a two-player demand-deposit contract model where players receive independent signals about their liquidity desire from a continuous type space. As our main result we demonstrate that this interval reduces to a unique probability of a panic-based bank strictly smaller than one if and only if there exist types for which not running on the bank is a dominant action. In addition to existing models of bank runs such as, e.g., Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), our approach also provides some assessment of the likelihood of a bank run if there are no types for which not running on the bank is a dominant action. As a consequence, we can investigate the comparative statics of the likelihood of bank runs with respect to a larger range of payoff parameters than considered in previous models. Furthermore, we derive a technical result by which the findings of Morris and Shin (2005) on the dominance-solvability of binary action games with strategic complements also apply to nice games in the sense of Moulin (1984) if players' best response functions are increasing.



1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-800 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Tarafdar ◽  
Xian-Zhi Yuan

In this paper, the concepts of random maximal elements, random equilibria and random generalized games are described. Secondly by measurable selection theorem, some existence theorems of random maximal elements forLc-majorized correspondences are obtained. Then we prove existence theorems of random equilibria for non-compact one-person random games. Finally, a random equilibrium existence theorem for non-compact random generalized games (resp., random abstract economics) in topological vector spaces and a random equilibrium existence theorem of non-compact random games in locally convex topological vector spaces in which the constraint mappings are lower semicontinuous with countable number of players (resp., agents) are given. Our results are stochastic versions of corresponding results in the recent literatures.



Optimization ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. E. M. Borm ◽  
R. Cao ◽  
I. García-Jurado


Author(s):  
Yaron Azrieli ◽  
Dan Levin


2012 ◽  
Vol 160 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 948-958
Author(s):  
Nikolai S. Kukushkin


Author(s):  
Werner Güth

Mechanism design is the game theoretic jargon for institutional design and the even older tradition (in German) of ‘Ordnungspolitik’ (institutional design policy). When implementing institutions or mechanisms (or simply rules of conduct) such regulation should usually be codified by complementing the law appropriately. This article first derives and discusses legal rules as traditionally justified and implemented legally. This is then confronted with game theoretic mechanism design, relying on Dominance Solvability or the Revelation Principle. It is argued that the Revelation Principle is very useful for welfaristic or, more generally, consequentialistic explorations of what is attainable but offers no practical basis for legal mechanism design due to its unrealistic common knowledge restrictions.



2019 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 110-125
Author(s):  
Ting Pei ◽  
Satoru Takahashi
Keyword(s):  


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