Znajomość zasad gwarantowania depozytów a skłonność do runu na banku

The main goal of the deposit guarantee scheme is to prevent banking panic and consequently to prevent banking crises. The purpose of the article is to check whether the knowledge of depositors about the existence of a deposit guarantee scheme and about the terms of the guarantee affects the propensity to bank run. Thus, the presented study emphasizes that the effectiveness of the deposit guarantee scheme is dependent on the degree of knowledge about the principles of its functioning in society. The results of 200 CATI interviews suggest that this knowledge does not affect the decision to run on a bank, but determines the run type. People with higher knowledge about the principles of deposit guarantee are more likely to make a non-cash form of run (transfer of funds to another bank). For people with less knowledge the cash withdrawal is dominant. Due to the finite cash resources in bank branches, the cash withdrawal form can increase the scale of the run through its mediality.

The African Development Bank

This chapter demonstrates how the African Development Bank (AfDB) has been deeply shaped by the history of its continent. Fuelled by a sentiment of independence, the creation of the AfDB was driven by a determination to create a regional bank run by Africans, funded by Africans, and serving African needs. African governments’ desire for autonomy and the quest to break with distorted patterns created by Africa’s colonial past helped position the AfDB as the largest development institution dedicated solely to serve the needs of the continent. This chapter argues that, over the years and—despite significant institutional reform, including the acceptance of non-regional members in its Board from 1982, including the United States and former colonial powers—the AfDB has managed overall to preserve its ‘African identity’.

The threat of outflow of individual deposits in systemically important banks of the Russian Federation: A retrospective analysis and regulatory outlook

Subject. The article focuses on the dynamics of individual deposits in the Russian systemically important banks as a factor of the stability of available resources. Objectives. I assess the threat of individual deposits outflowing from the Russian too-big-to-fail banks within 2015–2019. I correspondingly outline recommendations for mitigating the threat in the future. Methods. The study is based on methods of logic, comparative and statistical analysis. I devised and applied our own algorithm for classifying too-big-to-fail banks by threat of individual deposit outflow and its level. Results. Systemically important banks were found to have not been exposed to the high threat of bank run within 2015–2019. Three fundamental credit institutions were constantly exposed to the threat of individual deposit outflow. One of eleven systemic banks continuously demonstrated the low threat of individual deposit outflow. The rest of the banks were migrating among the low-threat and high-threat classes. Conclusions and Relevance. The Russian systemically important banks can refer to our findings to articulate their deposit policy, set and use digital accounts of retail customers. The Bank of Russian can rely on the analysis of the threat of individual deposit outflow and other data on financial and business operations of the banks and its sustainability as part of bank oversight procedures.

The Central Bank as Lender of Last Resort

In this chapter we review the function of the central bank as lender of last resort (LOLR), starting from the understanding of financial crises developed in the previous chapter. We recall long-established LOLR principles: proactive lending, inertia of the central bank risk control framework, and risk endogeneity. Because of its systemic role, a central bank should not tighten its collateral framework in a crisis, as restrictive policies are likely to not only increase the overall damage done by a crisis to society, but to even increase central bank losses. We explain in more detail the main reasons why a central bank should act as LOLR: prevent negative externalities from fire sales; its unique status as institution with unlimited liquidity; its status as a risk-free counterparty making others accept to deliver collateral to it even at high haircuts; and its mandate to preserve price stability. We distinguish three different forms of LOLR: elements built into the regular operational framework; readiness to relax parameters in a crisis; and provision of emergency liquidity assistance to individual firms. We then discuss what could be the optimal propensity of a central bank to engage in LOLR activities and outline possible trade-offs. Last but not least, we develop a bank-run model which highlights the role of asset liquidity and central bank eligible collateral. We calculate through a model variant with binary asset liquidity and uniform central bank collateral haircut, but then also introduce a model variant with continuous asset liquidity and haircuts.