scholarly journals The Need for Reform of the Australian Financial Regulatory System

1991 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn V. Currie
Author(s):  
McMeel Gerard

This chapter discusses the UK financial regulatory system. The two principal financial regulators are the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), responsible for the macro-prudential regulation and supervision of major institutions such as banks and insurance companies; and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), with a remit embracing the conduct of business of all financial firms and the micro-prudential supervision of smaller firms. The two regulators were created by the re-writing of the framework Act, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, by the Financial Services Act 2012. The chapter provisions of the 2000 Act and describes the FCA's and the PRA's Handbooks.


Author(s):  
Russen Jonathan ◽  
Kingham Robin

This introductory chapter traces the evolution of the UK financial regulatory system and provides an overview of the UK financial regulators. Following the introduction of the Financial Services Act 1986, the Securities and Investments Board (SIB) was established as the primary UK financial regulatory authority. However, a series of scandals shook the sector in the 1990s and brought public confidence in the SIB into question. The era of self-regulation was over. The SIB was renamed the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 1997 and, in December 2001, the FSA received a host of new powers through the commencement of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). Subsequently, the Financial Services Act 2012 significantly amended the FSMA, abolishing the FSA and creating in its place two new regulators: the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). However, the FCA and the PRA are not the only UK financial regulators. Since 2001, the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) has acted as an adjudicator in disputes between financial services firms and UK consumers. Other regulators with discrete or overlapping areas of responsibility include the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the Payment Systems Regulator (PSR), and the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers.


Author(s):  
Chester S. Spatt

The market crisis has highlighted the design of our financial regulatory system and to a degree identified some tensions within our current system. In turn, this provides a natural opportunity to reflect upon the underlying objectives of regulation and how various regulatory goals can clash.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 and 2 (1 and 2) ◽  
pp. 24-53
Author(s):  
Kristina Loguinova ◽  
Koen Byttebier

Ten years have passed after the last financial and economic crisis. As such, it is a good time to assess and to be reminded of the lessons that were learned and, more importantly, the lessons that were not learned, when it comes to the post-crisis reform of EU’s financial regulatory system. The current article aims at identifying the extent to which the Solvency II directive which codifies and harmonizes regulation regarding EU’s largest institutional investors, i.e. insurance undertakings, imitates its source of inspiration, Basel II, in order to introduce a critical way of thinking about the identified level of imitation. The main argument of this contribution is that since Solvency II is supposed to be revised this year, the EU legislator should embrace this opportunity to abstain from treating insurance undertakings as banks regulated under Basel II since Basel II did not prevent the financial and economic crisis of 2008 and arguably even added fuel to the fire. Moreover, the current article presents several other arguments as to why the regulatory model of Basel II is by no means a danger-free inspirational source for regulating insurance undertakings.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document