The Choice Between Private and Public Capital Markets: The Importance of Disclosure Standards and Auditor Discipline to Countries Divesting State-Owned Enterprises

Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Pittman ◽  
Omrane Guedhami

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (232) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zidong An ◽  
Alvar Kangur ◽  
Chris Papageorgiou

Most macroeconomic models assume that aggregate output is generated by a specification for the production function with total physical capital as a key input. Implicitly this assumes that private and public capital stocks are perfect substitutes. In this paper we test this assumption by estimating a nested-CES production function whereas the two types of capital are considered separately along with labor as inputs. The estimation is based on our newly developed dataset on public and private capital stocks for 151 countries over a period of 1960-2014 consistent with Penn World Table version 9. We find evidence against perfect substitutability between public and private capital, especially for emerging and LIDCs, with the point estimate of the elasticity of substitution estimated closely around 3.



Energy Policy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 121 ◽  
pp. 383-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah La Monaca ◽  
Martina Assereto ◽  
Julie Byrne




Author(s):  
Gortsos Christos V

This chapter systematically assesses the provisions of MiFID II (Articles 67-88) on supervision, enforcement, and cooperation by competent authorities. It addresses the role of Member States’ competent authorities within the MiFID II regime, with particular emphasis on the competent authorities’ supervisory powers, their power to impose administrative sanctions and measures, as well as criminal sanctions, and redress procedures. It considers cooperation arrangements between Member States’ competent authorities, the obligation to cooperate with the ESMA, and cooperation with third countries. Finally, these rules are briefly assessed on the basis of three elements pertaining to financial supervision, which, in the author’s view, are essential for the preservation of financial stability and the attainment of other goals underlying (public) capital markets law, and which are addressed by MiFID II’s provisions: micro-prudential supervisory effectiveness, the efficient and unobstructed exercise of competent authorities’ sanctioning powers, and the effectiveness of supervisory cooperation arrangements.





1998 ◽  
Vol 5 (8) ◽  
pp. 491-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.J. Erenburg


2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (11) ◽  
pp. 3481-3497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur J. Robson ◽  
Balázs Szentes

We consider a growth model in which intergenerational transfers are made via stocks of private and public capital. Private capital is the outcome of individuals' private savings while decisions regarding public capital are made collectively. We hypothesize that private saving choices evolve through individual selection while public saving decisions are the result of group selection. The main result of the paper is that the equilibrium rate of return to private capital is at least 2–3 percent more than the rate of return to public capital. In other words, social choices involving intertemporal trade-offs exhibit much more patience than individual choices do. (JEL D11, D71, D91, H43)



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