Discounting and Intergenerational Ethics

The question of social discounting is central in intertemporal cost-benefit analysis that often shapes economists’ recommendations regarding climate policy. The practice of discounting has been the object of heated debates among economists and philosophers, revolving around the issue of intergenerational ethics. In this chapter, we review the different arguments for and against specific values of social discounting. We show that there are actually two different ethical issues at stake: 1) the question of impartiality (or equal treatment of all generations); 2) the question of priority to the worse-off (aversion to inequality in resources, capabilities or welfare). These questions have emerged in the utilitarian approach and can be neatly separated in that case. They also have very different consequences for climate policy. We then argue that the question of social discounting is not confined to the utilitarian framework as it more generally describes the social value of income (or capability or welfare) transfers to future generations. Lastly, we discuss the many limitations of social discounting as a tool for policy analysis.

Sharing Personal Information is Discounted as a Function of Social Distance

Social discounting researchers have repeatedly shown that individuals discount sharing the amount of a monetary reward as a function of social distance, and that increasing the available monetary reward decreases sharing. However, no previous study has tested whether sharing nonmonetary commodities are discounted as a function of social distance. The current study tested whether sharing personal information would be discounted similarly to monetary rewards, as well as whether a magnitude effect occurred at a relatively small magnitude difference with 96 university students. A within-participant procedure showed that sharing personal information was discounted as a function of social distance, albeit with a steeper discounting rate relative to both monetary reward magnitudes. However, there was no significant association between personal information discounting rates and monetary discounting rates at either magnitude, suggesting that participants treated each commodity differently (i.e., commodity effect). Replicating previous non-U.S. samples, discounting rates for both monetary reward magnitudes were significantly positively associated with each other and showed a significant magnitude effect, with participants showing significantly steeper discounting rates for the relatively larger monetary rewards. The results for sharing personal information are important because many scams now target personal information in addition to money. Future research should examine what type of personal information is most likely to be shared as a function of social distance, and whether those participants who choose to share more personal information also are at greater risk for scams targeting personal information.

They Are Not Little Emperors: Only Children Are Just as Altruistic as Non-Only Children

Negative stereotypes about only children (OC) have caused widespread concern. However, relatively little is known about the accuracy of these stereotypes, especially regarding altruistic behaviors. In Study 1 ( N = 337), participants rated the altruism of OC and non-only children (NOC) on three measurements on the basis of the participants’ perceptions. Results revealed that participants rated OC as less altruistic, and the stereotype primarily came from NOC raters. Results of Study 2 ( N = 391) did not reveal any difference between OC and NOC in altruism. In Study 3 ( N = 99), a social discounting task was applied to further investigate whether OC and NOC displayed different degrees of altruistic behavior toward various social distances. No differences were found among individuals at close or distant social distances. Ultimately, this research indicates that the negative stereotype regarding the altruistic behavior of OC is an incorrect prejudice.

Introduction

Although philosophers have spent a great deal of time debating what “justice” requires, they have struggled when pressed to specify the implications that any particular conception of justice has for concrete questions of public policy. As a result, policy debates over the problem of anthropogenic climate change have been dominated by the normative framework of utilitarianism (or variants of the welfare consequentialism favored by economists), not for its intrinsic merits, but because it can easily be applied to the question, and generates plausible recommendations in most cases. This introduction presents the outlines of a “minimally controversial contractualism,” intended to serve as an alternative normative framework for developing climate change policy. It endorses the same plausible policy prescriptions in the standard cases while offering better resources for addressing the question of social discounting.