scholarly journals Satisfaction relations for proper classes: Applications in logic and set theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Van Wesep

AbstractWe develop the theory of partial satisfaction relations for structures that may be proper classes and define a satisfaction predicate (⊨*) appropriate to such structures. We indicate the utility of this theory as a framework for the development of the metatheory of first-order predicate logic and set theory, and we use it to prove that for any recursively enumerable extension Θ of ZF there is a finitely axiomatizable extension *Θ′ of GB that is a conservative extension of Θ. We also prove a conservative extension result that justifies the use of ⊨* to characterize ground models for forcing constructions.


1981 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 649-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. V. Quine

Quantification theory, or first-order predicate logic, can be formulated in terms purely of predicate letters and a few predicate functors which attach to predicates to form further predicates. Apart from the predicate letters, which are schematic, there are no variables. On this score the plan is reminiscent of the combinatory logic of Schönfinkel and Curry. Theirs, however, had the whole of higher set theory as its domain; the present scheme stays within the bounds of predicate logic.In 1960 I published an apparatus to this effect, and an improved version in 1971. In both versions I assumed two inversion functors, major and minor; also a cropping functor and the obvious complement functor. The effects of these functors, when applied to an n-place predicate, are as follows:The variables here are explanatory only and no part of the final notation. Ultimately the predicate letters need exponents showing the number of places, but I omit them in these pages.A further functor-to continue now with the 1971 version-was padding:Finally there was a zero-place predicate functor, which is to say simply a constant predicate, namely the predicate ‘I’ of identity, and there was a two-place predicate functor ‘∩’ of intersection. The intersection ‘F ∩ G’ received a generalized interpretation, allowing ‘F’ and ‘G’ to be predicates with unlike numbers of places. However, Steven T. Kuhn has lately shown me that the generalization is unnecessary and reducible to the homogeneous case.





1962 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Smiley

Anyone who reads Aristotle, knowing something about modern logic and nothing about its history, must ask himself why the syllogistic cannot be translated as it stands into the logic of quantification. It is now more than twenty years since the invention of the requisite framework, the logic of many-sorted quantification.In the familiar first-order predicate logic generality is expressed by means of variables and quantifiers, and each interpretation of the system is based upon the choice of some class over which the variables may range, the only restriction placed on this ‘domain of individuals’ being that it should not be empty.



1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
HERMAN GEUVERS ◽  
ERIK BARENDSEN

We look at two different ways of interpreting logic in the dependent type system λP. The first is by a direct formulas-as-types interpretation à la Howard where the logical derivation rules are mapped to derivation rules in the type system. The second is by viewing λP as a Logical Framework, following Harper et al. (1987) and Harper et al. (1993). The type system is then used as the meta-language in which various logics can be coded.We give a (brief) overview of known (syntactical) results about λP. Then we discuss two issues in some more detail. The first is the completeness of the formulas-as-types embedding of minimal first-order predicate logic into λP. This is a remarkably complicated issue, a first proof of which appeared in Geuvers (1993), following ideas in Barendsen and Geuvers (1989) and Swaen (1989). The second issue is the minimality of λP as a logical framework. We will show that some of the rules are actually superfluous (even though they contribute nicely to the generality of the presentation of λP).At the same time we will attempt to provide a gentle introduction to λP and its various aspects and we will try to use little inside knowledge.



1986 ◽  
pp. 155-183
Author(s):  
Igor Aleksander ◽  
Henri Farreny ◽  
Malik Ghallab


1992 ◽  
Vol 71 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1091-1104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter E. Langford ◽  
Robert Hunting

480 adolescents and young adults between the ages of 12 and 29 years participated in an experiment in which they were asked to evaluate hypotheses from quantified first-order predicate logic specifying that certain classes of event were necessarily, possibly, or certainly not included within a universe of discourse. Results were used to test a two-stage model of performance on hypothesis evaluation tasks that originated in work on the evaluation of conditionals. The two-stage model, unlike others available, successfully predicted the range of patterns of reply observed. In dealing with very simple hypotheses subjects in this age range tended not to make use of alternative hypotheses unless these were explicitly or implicitly suggested to them by the task. This tells against complexity of hypothesis as an explanation of the reluctance to use alternative hypotheses in evaluating standard conditionals.





Axioms ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malec

The aim of this article is to present a method of creating deontic logics as axiomatic theories built on first-order predicate logic with identity. In the article, these theories are constructed as theories of legal events or as theories of acts. Legal events are understood as sequences (strings) of elementary situations in Wolniewicz′s sense. On the other hand, acts are understood as two-element legal events: the first element of a sequence is a choice situation (a situation that will be changed by an act), and the second element of this sequence is a chosen situation (a situation that arises as a result of that act). In this approach, legal rules (i.e., orders, bans, permits) are treated as sets of legal events. The article presents four deontic systems for legal events: AEP, AEPF, AEPOF, AEPOFI. In the first system, all legal events are permitted; in the second, they are permitted or forbidden; in the third, they are permitted, ordered or forbidden; and in the fourth, they are permitted, ordered, forbidden or irrelevant. Then, we present a deontic logic for acts (AAPOF), in which every act is permitted, ordered or forbidden. The theorems of this logic reflect deontic relations between acts as well as between acts and their parts. The direct inspiration to develop the approach presented in the article was the book Ontology of Situations by Boguslaw Wolniewicz, and indirectly, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.





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