scholarly journals Practices and mechanisms to mitigate the negative effects of accountingbased earnings management: An empirical study from the professionals’ perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 15-28
Author(s):  
Monteiro et al. ◽  

Accounting conservatism and Accounting-based Earnings Management Practices (AEMP) introduce bias in financial information (FI), thereby influencing stakeholder behavior in the decision-making process. This study aims to analyze, from the certified accountants’ perspective, the AEMP in Portugal. Specifically, it analyses (1) the development of the AEMP and its impact on FI reporting, (2) the main hampered on its implementation, and (3) the need for the instruments and corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate the AEMP. Besides this research analyses (4) the relationship between the certified accountant’s characteristics (gender, age, professional experience, educational qualifications, and training area. To achieve the proposed objectives, we have used a quantitative methodological approach with a survey questionnaire, conducting an empirical study based on a sample of certified accountants. Based on a sample of 159 certified accountants, the results found that the majority of respondents indicate that Portuguese companies develop AEMP and that these practices have a negative and significant impact on the quality of financial statements (FS). Moreover, most certified accountants point out that is important to adopt measures that will prevent the abuse of AEMP and the main instruments for this are the establishments of more precise and concrete accounting standards and the application of the sanctions. The results also indicate that the audit committee and efficient internal control are corporate governance mechanisms AEMP able of mitigating the effects of the AEMP. Finally, the individual characteristics of certified accountants, such as professional experience, educational qualifications, and training area, significantly influence their perception of the need to mitigate the AEMP. This study presents relevant contributions to theory and practice. First, it develops the literature that evaluates AEMP, particularly in Portugal, where studies are scarce. Second, this study is original because it considers the relationship characteristics of accounting and AEMP professionals. Third, it allows entities that operate in accounting standardization and for accountants and FI users to have a more in-depth knowledge of the AEMP’s instruments and mechanisms.

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed A. Shabeeb Ali ◽  
Hazem Ramadan Ismael ◽  
Ahmed H. Ahmed

Using a UK panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations, we examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. We use multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses. We find that CEO equity incentives are related to higher absolute and income increasing earnings management. These results support the managerial power theory argument that CEOs exploit equity-linked compensation to obtain more personal benefits without causing public anger. Contrary to CEO equity incentives, we could not find any significant relationship between CFO equity incentives and any of the earnings management proxies. In addition, we find that corporate governance quality (measured by individual mechanisms and overall index) has no effect on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. This result indicates that whereas some corporate governance mechanisms can reduce earnings management in general, they do not affect wealth driven incentives to manipulate accruals. In total, results question the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in mitigating opportunistic behavior motivated by executives’ compensation structures


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-46
Author(s):  
Patrick Ulrich ◽  
Alexandra Fibitz

This paper examines how German family firms differ in the usage of corporate governance mechanisms in comparison to non-family firms. We give an overview about the relation of corporate governance and family firms, and deliver hypotheses from an empirical study. The study was conducted in 2017 as a written survey and 86 questionnaires could be used for statistical analysis. Based on socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory, we find that with a higher extent of family influence in the firm, less corporate governance instruments are used. Furthermore, corporate governance is used primarily to prevent stakeholder confidence in the long-run. However, a formalization of corporate governance mechanisms does not take place. We draw implications for more corporate governance formalization and awareness in family firms both for theory and practice.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anas Najeeb Mosa Ghazalat ◽  
Md.Aminul Islam ◽  
Idris Bin Mohd Noor

This paper attempts to review on how the effectiveness of board of directors and the executive compensations are moderated by internal ownership such as managerial and family ownership to mitigate earnings management. Most of prior studies focused on the traditional interaction among corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management, thus neglected that the variance of these practices that can be attributed to the business environment and the nature of ownership structure. This paper revisits the literature on the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors in the individual level such as board independence, size, meeting frequency, CEO duality, audit and nominations-compensations committees, directors financial expertise, tenures and multiple directorship etc. and as a bundle through creating a score of effectiveness on the earnings management practices. It also reviews on whether the managerial and family ownership can moderate the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors (as a score) and the total executive compensation with the earnings management practices. Panel data analysis method will applied over the data collected for ASE for the Jordanian listed firms for the period after the issuing of the Jordanian corporate codes in 2009. This paper’s contributes to the existing literature by providing an in-depth review of corporate governance mechanisms and earning management.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-295
Author(s):  
Stavroula Kourdoumpalou

This paper attempts to review on how the effectiveness of board of directors and the executive compensations are moderated by internal ownership such as managerial and family ownership to mitigate earnings management. Most of prior studies focused on the traditional interaction among corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management, thus neglected that the variance of these practices that can be attributed to the business environment and the nature of ownership structure. This paper revisits the literature on the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors in the individual level such as board independence, size, meeting frequency, CEO duality, audit and nominations-compensations committees, directors financial expertise, tenures and multiple directorship etc. and as a bundle through creating a score of effectiveness on the earnings management practices. It also reviews on whether the managerial and family ownership can moderate the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors (as a score) and the total executive compensation with the earnings management practices. Panel data analysis method will applied over the data collected for ASE for the Jordanian listed firms for the period after the issuing of the Jordanian corporate codes in 2009. This paper’s contributes to the existing literature by providing an in-depth review of corporate governance mechanisms and earning management.


Author(s):  
Sitraselvi Chandren ◽  
Zamri Ahmad ◽  
Ruhani Ali

This study examines the Malaysian accretive share buybacks firms from year 2001 to 2008 to determine the relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and accretive share buybacks, the earnings management device to meet or beat earnings per share (EPS) forecast. The regression results of this study reports the significant effect on the relationship between corporate governance and accretive share buyback. Basically, there is positive effect on the relationship between the board independence, CEO duality and board size with the accretive share buyback to meet or beat EPS forecast (MBEF). Multiple directorships and managerial ownership documents a negative relationship with accretive share buyback to MBEF. However, this study identified insignificant relationship between board meetings and accretive share buyback. Using the accretive share buyback as an earnings management proxy is a new contribution to determine the roles of corporate governance on accretive share buyback to MBEF rather a common study on accruals manipulations and corporate governance mechanisms. Keywords: Accretive Share Buyback; Corporate Governance; Earnings Management; Earnings per Share.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 1578-1596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Xuan Trang Nguyen

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms, including interest alignment and control devices, on the unrelated diversification level in Vietnam. Additionally, the moderation of free cash flow (FCF) on these relationships is also tested. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a balanced panel data set of 70 listed companies in both stock markets, Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange and Hanoi Stock Exchange, in Vietnam for the years 2007–2014, which gives 560 observations in total. Findings The results show that if executive ownership for CEOs is increased, then the extent of diversification is likely to be reduced. However, the link between unrelated diversification level and executive stock option, another interest alignment device, cannot be confirmed. Among three control devices (level of blockholder ownership, board composition and separation of CEO and chairman positions), the study finds a positive connection between diversification and blockholder ownership, and statistically insignificant relations between the conglomerate diversification level and board composition, or CEO duality. Additionally, this study discovers a negative link between diversification and state ownership, although there is no evidence to support the change to the effect of each internal corporate governance mechanism on the diversification level of a firm between high and low FCF. Practical implications The research can be a useful reference not only for investors and managers but also for policy makers in Vietnam. This study explores the relationship among corporate governance, diversification and firm value in Vietnam, where the topics related to effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms to public companies has been increasingly attractive to researchers since the default of Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin) happened in 2010 and the Circular No. 121/2012/TT-BTC on 26 July 2012 of the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance was issued with regulations on corporate governance applicable to listed firms in this country. Originality/value This research, first, enriches current literature on the relationship between corporate governance and firm diversification. It can be considered as a contribution to the related topic with an example of Vietnam, a developing country in Asia. Second, the research continues to prove non-unification in results showing the relationship between corporate governance and conglomerate diversification among different nations. Third, it provides a potential input for future research works on the moderation of FCF to the effects of corporate governance on diversification.


Author(s):  
Yongqiang Li ◽  
Anona Armstrong ◽  
Andrew Clarke

This paper examines a widely explored but yet to be confirmed relationship between two latent constructs - corporate governance and financial performance of small corporations in Australia. Prior studies have either focused on larger organisations or isolated corporate governance mechanisms in small firms. However, few have examined how corporate governance mechanisms, as a bundle, relate to small corporations. This study fills this gap by empirically analysing the aforementioned relationship using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). Based on 387 responses from small corporations, the results show that corporate governance bundles measured by the extant literature, has a negative impact on the financial performance of small corporations. The result calls for a stakeholder approach to the governance needs of small corporations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-120
Author(s):  
Karina Karina ◽  
Sutarti Sutarti

The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence of the affect of ownership concetration, firms size, and corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management. Ownership concetration was measure by the biggest stock of individual or organization, firms size was measure by natural logaritma of net assets, and corporate governance mechanisms were measure by three variabels (composition of board of commisioner, audit quality were measure by industry specialize audit firm, and composition of audit committee). Earnings management was measure by discretionary accruals use Modified Jones Method. The population of this research is 41 companies in the banking sector which were listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The research data were collected from banking companies financial statement for the period of 2016 to 2018. Based on purposive sampling method. The reseacrh hypotesis were tested using multiple regression analysis. The results of this research show that firm size, firm of commissioner and proportion of commissioner have significant relationships with earnings management. Next, variables composition of board of commissioner, ownership concetration and specialize audit firm have no significant relationship with earnings management. Keywords: ownership concetration, firms size, corporate governance, earnings management


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