The air war in Korea: Coalition air power in the context of limited war

The Norwegian army and navy built their separate air arms around a few flimsy aircraft acquired from 1912. During the interwar period, the Army Air Force desired independence while its smaller naval counterpart fought tenaciously to remain part of the navy. The battle was carried out in the national military journals. Army aviation officers seduced by the air power theories of Giulio Douhet advocated independent operations; they maintained that challenges of air war and the skills required were independent of the surface over which it was fought. They also expected economic benefits from a unified service that could acquire fewer types of aircraft and unify technical services and education. Naval aviation officers maintained that naval air operations required knowledge of naval warfare, seamanship, tight naval integration, and specialized aircraft. What’s more, they resented the very idea that air power could win wars independently.

Air power and limited war

Survival ◽

10.1080/00396336208440321 ◽

1962 ◽

Vol 4 (3) ◽

pp. 132-136

Author(s):

Michael Howard

Keyword(s):

Air Power ◽

Limited War

High-Altitude Daylight Precision Bombing in World War II

Lectures of the Air Corps Tactical School and American Strategic Bombing in World War II ◽

10.5810/kentucky/9780813176789.003.0008 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 195-224

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

World War Ii ◽

High Altitude ◽

The United States ◽

World War ◽

Air Power ◽

Air War ◽

Strategic Bombing ◽

Harsh Reality

This concluding chapter examines US air war planning in World War II and evaluates overall American strategic bombing effectiveness: how HADPB theory held up to the reality of combat. After sketching out the early air war in Europe leading up to the entry of the United States, the chapter considers several aspects of the role American strategic bombing played during World War II, including the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO), and evaluates how well the underlying assumptions of HADPB withstood the harsh reality of war. Finally, the chapter assesses how air power contributed overall to the Allied victory in Europe and analyzes the USAAF experience with HADPB against Japan.

5. The Second World War

Aerial Warfare: A Very Short Introduction ◽

10.1093/actrade/9780198804314.003.0005 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 61-73

Author(s):

Frank Ledwidge

Keyword(s):

Far East ◽

Second World War ◽

World War ◽

Air Power ◽

Air War ◽

Strategic Bombing ◽

The Far East ◽

Combined Operations ◽

The Pacific ◽

Second World

‘The Second World War: the air war in the Pacific’ describes the maritime and air operations in the Pacific that were truly epic in scale. It outlines the strategic bombing in the Far East as well as the two atomic raids carried out on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Prior to the atomic strikes on Japan, strategic bombing to coerce capitulation had failed in the combined operations against Germany. Even then, it seems likely now that the atomic raids contributed to rather than caused Japanese surrender. Command of the air was indispensable. However, air power alone could not deliver success. When used as a component of an integrated pragmatically founded strategy, it was nonetheless vital.

‘Foreshadows and Repercussions’: Histories of Air War and the Recasting of Cities and Citizens

Contemporary European History ◽

10.1017/s0960777314000368 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 23 (4) ◽

pp. 645-655

Author(s):

ADAM PAGE

Keyword(s):

Second World War ◽

World War ◽

Air Power ◽

Daily Lives ◽

Air War ◽

The City ◽

Second World

In the preface to the 1941 edition to his 1908 novel, The War in the Air, H. G. Wells wrote: ‘I told you so. You damned fools’. The books discussed here illustrate how, in the few intervening decades, air war moved from a fearful vision into reality, and detail the varied experiences and consequences of the aerial bombardment of cities and civilians. The histories of air power and the aerial bombardment of cities have centred on the Second World War, moving from the humanising endurance of Londoners during the Blitz to the entirely dehumanised horror of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The texts reviewed here extend the histories of air war and highlight the city and the home as a target for bombing while remaining the place where people carried on their daily lives.

The Coming War

Architect of Air Power ◽

10.5810/kentucky/9780813169989.003.0004 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Brian D. Laslie

Keyword(s):

Air Force ◽

Air Power ◽

Air War ◽

Set Up

Chapter Three is about the coming war and the invention of American air power. Kuter said on his arrival in Washington D.C. in 1939 that “One thing was apparent: whoever was running the Air Corps at that time, it wasn’t the Chief of the Air Corps.” This chapter will discuss the planning for the coming air war and the writing of Air War Planning Document-1 in only nine days. Beyond planning for an air war with an air force that did not exist, Kuter also led the effort to set up an Air Staff and in 1942 drew national attention by making a huge jump in rank. On January 5th, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and less than a month later to brigadier general on February 2nd, skipping the rank of bird colonel entirely. This made Kuter, at 36, the youngest general officer of his time and the youngest since William Sherman.

Casual War: NATO's Intervention in Kosovo

Ethics & International Affairs ◽

10.1111/j.1747-7093.2000.tb00052.x ◽

2000 ◽

Vol 14 ◽

pp. 39-54 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Carl Cavanagh Hodge

Keyword(s):

Twentieth Century ◽

Human Rights ◽

Information Systems ◽

International Relations ◽

Military Intervention ◽

Humanitarian Intervention ◽

Digital Information ◽

Moral Legitimacy ◽

Air Power ◽

Limited War

One of the most remarkable features of contemporary international relations is the new prestige accorded universal standards of human rights. However, NATO's attempt to redeem the promise of human rights by way of military intervention during the recent Kosovo crisis may have established a disturbing precedent for humanitarianism. The Alliance exploited the capabilities of precision weaponry and digital information systems to wage war with air power alone, thus avoiding entirely the deployment of ground troops and the domestic political exposure such a deployment inevitably involves. The best available evidence is that this approach had little immediate effect on the atrocities carried out by Serbian troops in Kosovo and that NATO's overriding concern with casualty-avoidance in war undermined both the effectiveness and the moral legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Even more disturbing is the question whether NATO's action implies that states endowed with the advanced military assets that were brought to bear against Serbia will adopt a casual policy on the conduct of limited war, a policy at odds with the lessons of the twentieth century.

Electronic Records of the Air War Over Southeast Asia

Journal of Vietnamese Studies ◽

10.1525/vs.2014.8.4.86 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 8 (4) ◽

pp. 86-124 ◽

Cited By ~ 20

Author(s):

Holly High ◽

James R. Curran ◽

Gareth Robinson

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Southeast Asia ◽

The United States ◽

Electronic Records ◽

Air Power ◽

Air War ◽

Joint Chiefs Of Staff ◽

New Evidence ◽

Indochina War ◽

Target Country

The United States conducted a massive bombing campaign over Southeast Asia during the Second Indochina War. The joint chiefs of staff attempted to compile comprehensive databases of all US and allied air sorties during the conflict. In this article, we show how we tested the reliability of two of the most commonly used databases and then determined what they tell us about the air war, especially in terms of the tons of ordnance expended. The database indicates tonnage figures similar to those in existing accounts of the bombing of Laos, Vietnam or Cambodia and also contains new evidence of some limited bombing of Thailand. It suggests each target country suffered markedly distinct bombing patterns that were often related inversely to each other. This supports the interpretation that the use of air power was not purely tactical but also driven by the availability of air power.

Here’s Your Air War

War in the American Pacific and East Asia, 1941-1972 ◽

10.5810/kentucky/9780813176550.003.0003 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 54-92

Author(s):

Steve Call

Keyword(s):

World War Ii ◽

Public Support ◽

Air Power ◽

Air War ◽

The Public ◽

Audience Appeal ◽

The Pacific ◽

War Effort ◽

Popular Magazine ◽

Magazine Articles

By World War II, public fascination with aviation and air power had created a powerful presence in popular culture.Military and government leaders sought to exploit that presence in shaping public perceptions of the war against Japan and the public fascination that drove it, but so too did writers, editors, producers, and even air power theorists.Movies, books, and popular magazine articles in significant numbers featured air power themes in a number of different guises.Some sought merely to cash in on audience appeal, while others sought to boost public morale or support for the war effort; still others used the various media to build public support for air power itself or to push distinctive theories about air power’s application.Regardless of intent, these depictions reached wide audiences and helped shape attitudes toward the war, the enemy, and air power itself, giving a unique insight into the nature of the Pacific air war.