scholarly journals The revisability of commonsense psychology

2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-61
Author(s):  
Nada Gligorov
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Empirical Theory ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
False Theory ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Various views of the mind/body problem adopt one of the two general strategies towards explaining phenomena: one approach is to take into account the intuitions found in common sense, and the second is to go against those intuitions. The first type of theory attempts to ground views of particular phenomena on our common sense. Eliminative Materialism (EM) is not such an approach. EM urges that commonsense psychology is false and should be replaced by neuroscience. Eliminativism has often been challenged. Some have attacked the premise that commonsense psychology is a theory; others have attacked the claim that it is a false theory, which can be replaced. I plan to countenance the argument that commonsense psychology is an empirical theory that can be replaced, which will, surprisingly, lead me to an argument against eliminativism. My view is that commonsense psychology cannot be eliminated because there are no commonsense theories.

A Common Sense Approach to the Mind-Body Problem

1992 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 279-286
Author(s):  
Russell A. Lascola ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

scholarly journals The dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience: what does philosophy of mind say?

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 186-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elie Cheniaux ◽  
Carlos Eduardo de Sousa Lyra
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Current Knowledge ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Subjective Experiences ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
Brain States ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Objective: To briefly review how the main monist and dualist currents of philosophy of mind approach the mind-body problem and to describe their association with arguments for and against a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.Methods: The literature was reviewed for studies in the fields of psychology, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind.Results: Some currents are incompatible with a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neurosciences: interactionism and psychophysical parallelism, because they do not account for current knowledge about the brain; epiphenomenalism, which claims that the mind is a mere byproduct of the brain; and analytical behaviorism, eliminative materialism, reductive materialism and functionalism, because they ignore subjective experiences. In contrast, emergentism claims that mental states are dependent on brain states, but have properties that go beyond the field of neurobiology.Conclusions: Only emergentism is compatible with a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.

Kant’s Perspectival Solution to the Mind-Body Problem

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 194-213
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Palmquist
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Early Career ◽  
Good Science ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
Critical Theories ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Spatio Temporal ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Causal Nexus

Kant’s Critical philosophy solves Descartes’ mind-body problem, replacing the dualism of the “physical influx” theory he defended in his early career. Kant’s solution, like all Critical theories, is “perspectival,” acknowledging deep truth in both opposing extremes. Minds are not separate from bodies, but a manifestation of them, each viewed from a different perspective. Kant’s transcendental conditions of knowledge portray the mind not as creating the physical world, but as necessarily structuring our knowledge of objects with a set of unconscious assumptions; yet our pre-conscious (pre-mental) encounter with an assumed spatio-temporal, causal nexus is entirely physical. Hence, today’s “eliminative materialism” and “folk psychology” are both ways of considering this age-old issue, neither being an exclusive explanation. A Kantian solution to this version of the mind-body problem is: eliminative materialism is good science; but only folk psychologists can consistently be eliminative materialists. Indeed, the mind-body problem exemplifies a feature of all cultural situations: dialogue between opposing perspectives is required for understanding as such to arise.

The Mind-Body Problem Revisited

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 660-660
Author(s):  
MADGE SCHEIBEL ◽  
ARNOLD SCHEIBEL
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

Brute Necessity and the Mind–Body Problem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Van Cleve
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

In a growing number of papers one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. For short, they imply that there are brute necessities. Therefore, the arguments conclude, the views in question should be rejected in favor of rival views under which the necessities would be explained. This style of argument raises a number of questions. Do necessary truths really require explanation? Are they not paradigms of truths that either need no explanation or automatically have one, being in some sense self-explanatory? If necessary truths do admit of explanation or even require it, what types of explanation are available? Are there any necessary truths that are truly brute? This chapter surveys various answers to these questions, noting their bearing on arguments from brute necessity and arguments concerning the mind–body problem.

Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. Michael E. Levin

Ethics ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-176
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind
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