The Use of Deadly Force in the Protection of Property under the Model Penal Code

1959 ◽  
Vol 59 (8) ◽  
pp. 1212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus D. Dubber

Part III of Dual Penal State uses dual penal state analysis to generate a comparative-historical account of American penality. With comparative glimpses at Germany and, to a lesser extent, England, it distinguishes between two responses to the shared challenge of legitimating state penal power in a modern liberal democratic state: (1) the failure to appreciate the legitimatory challenge of modern state penal power in particular (United States) and of modern state power in general (England); and (2) the failure to address the legitimatory challenge of modern state penal power as an ongoing existential threat to the legitimacy of the state (Germany). Chapter 7 brings the narrative of modern American penality up-to-date, following on the heels of the discussion of Jefferson’s Virginia criminal law bill of 1779 in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 focuses on the Model Penal Code of 1962, which was far superior to Jefferson’s draft in every respect but one: it, too, failed to integrate state punishment into the American legal-political project, leaving the penal paradox unaddressed and unresolved to this day.


2021 ◽  
pp. 155-186
Author(s):  
R. Barry Ruback

This last chapter, Chapter 8, looks at larger issues of economic sanctions. Reitz and Klingele, the reporters of the Model Penal Code argued that economic sanctions are unprincipled (they violate legal standards and discriminate against the poor), unsuccessful (they are generally unpaid and, as presently constituted, do not meet the purposes of sentencing), and are unending (local and state governments are continuing to impose economic sanctions and other legal financial obligations in order to meet budgetary needs). Also, in the final chapter the author discusses how the existing research can be used to inform policy, particularly regarding questions of whether there should be different types of economic sanctions, what those types should be, and what amounts of economic sanctions should be imposed. These policy arguments are based on the assumption that the law and courts should be concerned about victims, offenders, and the community.


Author(s):  
David O. Brink

Fair opportunity supports a modified version of the Model Penal Code insanity test, against the narrower M’Naghten test. The Andrea Yates case is introduced as a paradigmatic insanity defense. Recent arguments that psychopaths should be excused because their psychological deficits prevent them from developing cognitive competence about moral norms are considered and rejected. Moral blindspots involving selective discrimination raise questions about selective incompetence. In general, the selective nature of these blindspots implies that agents with blindspots have the capacity to correct their moral ignorance and so should not be excused.


1990 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Hampton

Accusing, condemning, and avenging are part of our daily life. However, a review of many years of literature attempting to analyze our blaming practices suggests that we do not understand very well what we are doing when we judge people culpable for a wrong they have committed. Of course, everyone agrees that, for example, someone deserves censure and punishment when she is guilty of a wrong, and the law has traditionally looked for a mens rea, or “guilty mind,” in order to convict someone of a criminal wrongdoing. But philosophers and legal theorists have found it interestingly difficult to say what mens rea is. For example, noting the way in which we intuitively think people aren't culpable for a crime if they disobey the law by mistake, or under duress, or while insane, theorists such as H.L.A. Hart have tried to define mens rea negatively, as that which an agent has if he is not in what we consider to be an excusing state. But such an approach only circumscribes and does not unravel the central mystery; it also fails to explain why the law recognizes any excusing states as mitigating or absolving one of guilt, much less why all and only the excusing states that are recognized by the law are the right ones. Moreover, the Model Penal Code, which gives a very detailed account of the kinds of mental states which justify criminal conviction, does not tell us (nor was it designed to tell us) why these states of mind (e.g., knowledge, purposiveness, intention, assumption of risk of harm, negligence) are relevant to an assessment of legal guilt.


Legal Studies ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glanville Williams

Any project to draft a criminal code has to compromise between the desirable and the politically possible. It may be that the draft now produced by the Law Commission, or something like it, is the best that can safely be backed, though the contrast between it and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (which also had to take account of political realities, and yet has been adopted in many States) is a painful reflection on our stodginess. It is hard to avoid the impression that the Law Commission have been too cautious in their approach, leaning too much in favour of bare restatement of the existing law and against modifications that experience or reflection show to be necessary.


1969 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-493
Author(s):  
Helen Silving

The state of our “criminal law” in 1905 was described by William H. Taft as “a disgrace to our civilization”. This state had not changed much almost half a century later, when Justice Frankfurter quoted Mr. Taft's statement. Several major modern reform projects formulated since 1952 introduced some noteworthy modifications. I have in mind particularly the American Law Institute Model Penal Code, on the one hand, and the German Draft of a Penal Code, both of 1962, on the other. In the former I should like to draw attention to the serious attempt at a systematization of punishment scales, and in the latter to the effort at a systematic structuring of the “guilt principle”. The German Draft incorporated results of various revisions introduced since the collapse of the National Socialist régime, by either statutory or judicial legislation—revisions born out of the growing concern in Germany with “guilt”. Prominent among these revisions, of course, is adoption of the defence of “error of law” of ancient origin, derived from biblical, talmudic and canon law teaching. Nevertheless, these two projects have but touched the surface of the profound problems that are involved in formulating truly modern penal legislation.


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