scholarly journals The Doctrine of Equity. A Commentary on the Law as Administered by the Court of Chancery

1891 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 295
Author(s):  
G. C. ◽  
John Adams ◽  
Robert Ralston
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  
1929 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-375
Author(s):  
Serjeant A. M. Sullivan

Forty years ago in my old country the legal world was in a state of transition. The old order was changing in a great number of ways. The Judicature Act had just got into swing and although four Courts still opened in the hall beside the Liffey they were soon to be fused into one. These were at that time the Court of Chancery, the Court of Queen's Bench, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Common Pleas, and the doors of these four opened on the Central Hall and their names stood over them. The Court of Chancery stood by itself, but it was thought in those days that you had your choice of three Common Law Courts in which to have your case tried. If you had some merit on your side but thought that the law was against you, you issued your writ in the Queen's Bench, which was presided over by Mickey Morris, as he was invariably called although he was a lord, because Mickey had a good deal of common sense, a great deal of humanity, but his ideas of jurisprudence were peculiarly his own. On the other hand, if you were strongly of opinion that however iniquitous your client was, he had the law on his side, you issued your writ in the Court of Exchequer, presided over by Christopher Palles, the greatest judge before whom I have ever appeared. Christopher Palles decided according to what he believed to be the law, and would pay no attention to any other consideration that might be advanced before him.


1979 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 317-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan J. Busch

Reform of the law and the courts, especially the Court of Chancery, has been one of the most active areas of interest among historians concerned with the Interregnum period of English history. However, the authors on law reform have relied primarily upon the plethora of pamphlet literature and other printed materials which have led them to conclude that the legal profession obstructed reform of the law to protect its vested interests in offices and fees. Bulstrode Whitelocke, one of the lords commissioners of the great seal (the Chancery judges of the Interregnum) from 1649 to 1655, has long served historians as an example of the legal profession's refusal to assist or to cooperate in any meaningful reformation of the law or equity. Recently, Donald Veall, David Underdown, and Blair Worden have again laid the failure of reform at the door of the lawyers and judges who sat in the Rump, on commissions of law reform, and in the Protectorate parliaments. They have also assigned to Whitelocke a major responsibility for the defeat of law reform in the Rump, both before and after the Hale Commission's comprehensive plan of reform in January 1653, and in the first Protectorate Parliament in 1654. They believe, despite Whitelock's fervor for professional standards and his mild reforming tendencies, that he represented the major hurdle for any successful reform in law or equity.


1852 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 62
Author(s):  
John Adams ◽  
James R. Ludlow ◽  
John M. Collins
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

2003 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Polden

Jarndyce v Jarndyce, the great lawsuit created by Charles Dickens in Bleak House, published in serial form in 1852–3, as a microcosm of all the manifold evils of the Court of Chancery, so permeated the popular consciousness that it seems rather to belong among the Leading Cases so fruitfully explored by Brian Simpson than in the pages of A.P. Herbert's fictional Misleading Cases.1 Since it has often been said to have been based upon one or two real cases, particularly the ‘Jennens Case’, this article began as an attempt to compare the real with the fictional case—to see how far Jennens was indeed ‘the real Jarndyce v Jarndyce’.2 What emerged from that examination, however, was not only a much more complicated story, and a cautionary tale about too ready an acceptance of real models for fictional events, but one which throws light on a seldom explored species of legal proceeding, which had an international dimension, and the ways it was promoted and financed. It also highlights the acute difficulties experienced by claimants and their adversaries in furnishing legally admissible and conclusive evidence of identities and relationships before the implementation of the Marriage Act 1836 and the Registration Act 1837. Gaps and defects in the older sources encouraged the pursuit of optimistic claims and ensured that, in those cases which reached the courts, their resolution would be lengthy, costly and not always satisfactory. And when the law deployed the blunt instrument of limitation periods to curtail proceedings, that in turn led the more determined claimants to muddy the waters with allegations of fraud.


Author(s):  
John Baker

This chapter traces the history of the Court of Chancery and equity. The equitable jurisdiction derived from the extraordinary jurisdiction of the king’s council. By 1400 the chancellor had his own court and was issuing decrees in his own name. It was not tied to law but could coerce the conscience of a defendant, for instance to desist from an unconscionable suit at law. Equity was not in conflict with the law, but there was a dispute between Coke and Ellesmere in 1615 over injunctions after judgment. Most equitable principles began with relief given on the facts of individual cases, but the multitude of suits generated common principles, many of which were elucidated by Lord Nottingham. The court’s initially informal procedure became unmanageably complex as more suitors resorted to it. The later Chancery was a byword for delay and despair; the chapter ends with an account of its reform.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Leslie ◽  
Mary Casper

“My patient refuses thickened liquids, should I discharge them from my caseload?” A version of this question appears at least weekly on the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association's Community pages. People talk of respecting the patient's right to be non-compliant with speech-language pathology recommendations. We challenge use of the word “respect” and calling a patient “non-compliant” in the same sentence: does use of the latter term preclude the former? In this article we will share our reflections on why we are interested in these so called “ethical challenges” from a personal case level to what our professional duty requires of us. Our proposal is that the problems that we encounter are less to do with ethical or moral puzzles and usually due to inadequate communication. We will outline resources that clinicians may use to support their work from what seems to be a straightforward case to those that are mired in complexity. And we will tackle fears and facts regarding litigation and the law.


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