Negligence. In General. Both Parties in Head-On Collision Held Liable under Comparative Negligence Rule Although Evidence Did Not Compel Inference That Both Were Negligent

1955 ◽  
Vol 68 (8) ◽  
pp. 1473
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Negligence ◽  
Negligence Rule

Comparative Negligence as a Buffer Against Erroneous Standards

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci ◽  
Eva-Susanne Hendriks
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Negligence

scholarly journals Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Care through Liability and Regulation

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yeon-Koo Che
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Level Of Care ◽  
Preventative Care ◽  
Settlement Rate ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Legal Standard ◽  
Settlement Behavior ◽  
Legal Costs ◽  
Perverse Effect ◽  
Negligence Rule

Abstract This paper examines the incentive performance of liability and regulation when a potential injurer can take two types of preventative care, one of which is observed and one of which is not. The problem is studied in a general asymmetric information model, where settlement behavior is endogenous and which incorporates an uncertain legal standard. Contrary to existing literature, we find (1) a shift to a negligence rule may have a perverse effect on unobserved care; (2) uncertainty in legal standards may be socially beneficial as it provides a relatively good incentive for unobserved care; (3) a regulation may not be effective if preventative care efforts are substitutes but is effective if they are complements; (4) an increase in settlement rate may or may not increase the level of care, depending on the cause of the increase; (5) a “decoupling” arrangement with a feature that the defendant pays more than the plaintiff recovers, reduces legal costs and is therefore socially beneficial.

Lapses and Substitution

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert D. Cooter ◽  
Ariel Porat
Keyword(s):  
Tort Law ◽  
Liability Law ◽  
Negligence Rule

This chapter deals with lapses of attention, for example by a driver or a doctor, and explains how a negligence rule gives injurers an incentive to substitute activities with unavoidable accidents for activities with lapses. Under current tort law, a lapse of attention will always be considered negligence and trigger liability for the resulting harm. However, the chapter shows that it should not be the case. After providing an overview of lapse defenses in prevailing law, the chapter examines the openness of liability law to the lapse defense and some activities that substitute unavoidable harm for lapses. It also explains how a lapse defense is implemented and shows how the lapse defense dampens inefficient substitution and increases collection of supporting information.

Uncertainty Regarding Interpretation of the “Negligence Rule” and Its Implications for the Efficiency of Outcomes

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Satish K. Jain
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Probability ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Subjective Probabilities ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Important Conclusion ◽  
Standard Version ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Negligence Rule

AbstractThere are two ways that the negligence rule is interpreted. Under one interpretation a negligent injurer is liable for the entire harm to the victim; and under the other interpretation a negligent injurer is liable only for that part of the harm which can be ascribed to his negligence. Both these versions are efficient. However, if there is uncertainty regarding whether the court will be employing the full liability version or the incremental liability version for determining the liability of a negligent injurer, notwithstanding the fact that both the versions are efficient, inefficiency is possible. It is shown in the paper that a necessary and sufficient condition for efficiency in all cases is that the subjective probability with which the injurer expects the standard version to be employed must be greater than or equal to the subjective probability with which the victim expects the standard version to be employed. For the subset of applications without complementarities in the cares of the two parties and which are such that the total social costs are minimized at a unique care-configuration, it is shown that efficiency obtains regardless of the subjective probabilities with which the parties expect the two versions. One very important conclusion that emerges from the analysis of this paper is that when courts employ more than one liability rule, even if all the employed rules are efficient, the efficiency of all outcomes cannot be taken for granted merely on the ground of the efficiency of the employed rules.

scholarly journals The Mistaken Restriction of Strict Liability to Uncommon Activities

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 1-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Shavell
Keyword(s):  
Natural Gas ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Activity Requirement ◽  
Negligence Rule

Abstract Courts generally insist that two criteria be met before imposing strict liability rather than basing liability on the negligence rule. The first—that the injurer’s activity must be dangerous—is sensible because strict liability possesses general advantages over the negligence rule in controlling risk. But the second—that the activity must be uncommon—is ill-advised because it exempts all common activities from strict liability no matter how dangerous they are. Thus, the harm generated by the large swath of common dangerous activities—from hunting, to construction, to the transmission of natural gas—is inadequately regulated by tort law. After developing this theme and criticizing ostensible justifications for the uncommon activity requirement, the article addresses the question of how it arose. The answer is that its legal pedigree is problematic: it appears to have been invented by the authors of the first Restatement of Torts. The conclusion is that the uncommon activity requirement for the imposition of strict liability should be eliminated.

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