Platform Economy and Product Liability: Old Rules for New Markets

According to statistics, Amazon is one of the most-used online marketplaces worldwide. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdowns to reduce the spread of the virus have shown how critical online marketplaces are to enable e-commerce and keep commercial transactions alive, especially in such times when regular commerce is disrupted. However, when we buy online, we have no chance of examining whether the product works or whether it is defective. If something goes wrong when we buy a product from a third-party seller through Amazon, as consumers, we then face the challenge of trying to file a claim for the damages that might have arisen due to the defectiveness of the product. This article explores Amazon’s position in this scenario, with reference to the case law from both US and EU courts and regulations, not solely from the point of view of Product Liability Law, but also according to the E-Commerce Directive liability.

The State as a Party to Private Law Relations

The purpose of the study is to cover the analysis of the legal position of the state in private law relations. Particular attention is paid to the dualistic nature of the state – as a sovereign and as a horizontal participant in civil law relations. The study employs the following methods: dialectical, technical and comparative law. Results of the systematic interpretation suggest that the state does not have the status of a person, which complicates the application of some legal structures. It is concluded that the state is a multi-stage entity that includes the state of Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and territorial communities. This paper will be useful for advocates, judges, academics whose area of expertise is the problematics of the liability law, as well as the issue of harmonisation of the civil legislation of Ukraine with the civil legislation of the EU countries.

Polluter Pays Principle Terkait Pertanggungjawaban Corporate PTTEP Australasia Terhadap Pencemaran Minyak Di Laut Timur Indonesia

This research is aimed to analyze and determine the 16th provision principle of the declaration on environment and development, namely the polluter pays principle, as one of the state’s form of accountability towards the polluting across borders between PTTEP Australia and Indonesia. This is a juridical research, which analyzes the issue discussed through the use of many realted sources. The Polluter Pyas Principle, as a form of State responsibility in environmental pollution, has some advantages and disadvantages when applied as a recommendation by the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). From a legal perspective, this principle can be applied as a civil liability law, whereas from an economic perspective, it can be viewed as effort to control pollution by means which the polluter has an obligation to pay for the environmental pollution that he/she caused. Even so this principle also has its weakness, in an economic approach this principle is difficult to determine the determination of the cost of loss. In some countries themselves have applied this principle in handling cases of environmental pollution. In the case of cross-border environmental pollution, the principle of good neighborliness and the principle of state responsibility in dealing with pollution cases as a sign of State’s goodwill to comply with existing international law. The case of environmental pollution itself is not only the State that can sue, but a group of people or the community can also sue, if they feel harmed by the pollution that occurs. One of them is by carrying out Class Action in holding accountable for the consequences of pollution that has occurred, and is detrimental to a group or large number of people. Even though international environmental law is a soft law, it can become hard law depending on the pollution case that occurs. Even so, International Environmental Law contained in the Stockholm Declaration, Rio de Jeneiro, Civil Liability Convention and other related international arrangements have been very good in their regulatory fields. Only the state which ratifies the convention applies according to the pollution case that occurs.

On Behavioural Asymmetry in Product Liability Law

This theoretical article identifies the asymmetry between the producer and the consumer as the key to understanding product liability law. In an attempt to resolve the endless scholarly and jurisprudential debates on the proper criterion for defectiveness in European law, it first tracks the ways in which the commonly opposed consumer expectations and risk-utility test each fail to address the typical asymmetries between producers and consumers in a satisfying manner. Building upon the concept of ‘behavioural asymmetry’, it then develops a new criterion for defectiveness under European law: the behavioural risk-utility test. Under a behavioural risk-utility test, the producer is liable if the product is not reasonably safe for average users suffering from cognitive biases and other behavioural shortcomings. This test aptly combines the systemic point of view of risk-utility balancing with an evidence-based conception of asymmetry, and therefore provides a meaningful criterion for adjudicating product liability disputes.

Die Präventionswirkung des Staatshaftungsrechts

This contribution addresses the question of whether and to what extent state liability law has a preventive effect. The question focuses on whether the (mere) existence of claims under state liability law creates an incentive to prevent unlawful actions against citizens. Cases in which an incentive is created for an individual public official (individual preventive effect) are differentiated from those in which an incentive is created for the state as an organisation (organisational preventive effect). Based on an economic analysis of law, the article demonstrates – in abstract terms and detached from concrete bases for claims – that both effects can occur: On the one hand, liability claims can prevent public officials from deliberately making unlawful decisions and as well as increase the diligence and so the probability of a lawful decision. On the other hand, liability claims can influence an organisation in the state sector in such a way that those responsible strive to ensure lawful decisions by means of the improved structuring and scrutiny of the decision-making process. To establish the specific preventive effect of an individual claim under (German) state liability law, it is necessary to consider its specific structure. The allocation of liability and the possibility of an internal recourse determine whether the preventive effect achieved is (more) an individual or an organisational one. The decisive criteria for the intensity of the preventive effect include the type, extent, degree of collectivisation, and limitations of the liability claim as well as its enforceability. Regardless of the necessary differentiation, it may be concluded that the claims of German state liability law emphasise an organisational preventive effect. While they implement the preventive effect to some extent overall, they do not fully do so. There are viable reasons for this restraint, considering the at times contrary objective of an efficiently acting administration. As a result, as this contribution concludes, from a legal policy perspective, a preventive effect also depends on considering additions and alternatives to state liability law.

Liability for Violating Standards in Shia Jurisprudence and Iranian Law

Standards are of critical importance for protecting public health and ensuring the integrity of transactions and the consistency of the quality of goods and services. Violation of standards can do significant harm to individuals and the society as a whole. Since people are entitled to the right of consuming goods with adequate safety and quality, standards themselves can be considered a civil right. The issue of damages and compensation in relation to the violation of standards has been addressed in Iranian law as well as Shia jurisprudence. In Shia jurisprudence, causing harm to others makes a person liable to coercive action and compensation. According to Article 1 of the Iranian Civil Liability Law, anyone who has intentionally or unintentionally caused material or moral damage to another person’s life, health, property, liberty, dignity, business reputation or any other right that the other person is entitled to by law is liable for compensation for the damages caused by his action. In this article, we examine the jurisprudential arguments that support the necessity of enforcing standards and the liabilities that arise from violation of standards in Iranian law. In this regard, Quran verses and hadiths call for accuracy and consistency in all matters, honesty in work, and respect for laws. The Shia jurisprudential principles that call for the observance of standards include La-zarar (no-harm), Tasbib (causation), and Ghorur (deception). Therefore, there is a strong foundation in Shia jurisprudence for enforcing standards. However, Iranian law requires stronger laws with harsher punishment for violators to prevent negligence in complying with standards.

Liability for AI: public policy considerations

Liability for AI is the subject of a lively debate. Whether new liability rules should be introduced or not and how these rules should be designed hinges on the function of liability rules. Mainly, they create incentives for risk control, varying with their requirements – especially negligence versus strict liability. In order to do so, they have to take into account who is actually able to exercise control. In scenarios where a clear allocation of risk control is no longer possible, social insurance might step in.This article discusses public policy considerations concerning liability for artificial intelligence (AI). It first outlines the major risks associated with current developments in information technology (IT) (1.). Second, the implications for liability law are discussed. Liability rules are seen conceptualized as an instrument for risk control (2.). Negligence liability and strict liability serve different purposes making strict liability the rule of choice for novel risks (3.). The key question is, however, who should be held liable (4.). Liability should follow risk control. In future scenarios where individual risk attribution is no longer feasible social insurance might be an alternative (5). Finally, the innovation function of liability rules is stressed, affirming that appropriate liability rules serve as a stimulus for innovation, not as an impediment (6.).