A Criticism of Lovejoy's Case for Epistemological Dualism

1963 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 527
Author(s):  
Charles A. Baylis
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Dualism

Against Neuropsychoanalysis: Why a Dialogue With Neuroscience Is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Psychoanalysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-336
Author(s):  
Elisa Galgut
Keyword(s):  
Anomalous Monism ◽  
The Real ◽  
Conceptual Distinction ◽  
Epistemological Dualism

The author argues against neuropsychoanalysis by focusing on the metaphysical issues. Neuropsychoanalysts argue that the philosophical theories of dual aspect monism (DAM) and anomalous monism support their position. The author contends that not only do DAM and anomalous monism not offer support for neuropsychoanalysis; they are also inconsistent with its claims. The conceptual distinction between the mental and the physical — the so-called “epistemological dualism” cited by neuropsychoanalysis—stands as an insurmountable barrier to the project of neuropsychoanalysis. By way of example, the author offers an analogy with artworks. The author concludes the paper by arguing that neuropsychoanalysis deflects from the real project of psychoanalysis, which is the study of persons, not so-called “mindbrains.”

Linguistic and Epistemological Dualism

1960 ◽  
pp. 127-144
Author(s):  
John W. Yolton
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Dualism

A Statement of Epistemological Dualism

1916 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 169
Author(s):  
A. K. Rogers
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Dualism

scholarly journals PERCEIVING THINGS IN THEMSELVES: ABŪ L-BARAKĀT AL-BAĠDĀDĪ’S CRITIQUE OF REPRESENTATIONALISM

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fedor Benevich
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Direct Relation ◽  
Islamic Philosophy ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
History Of ◽  
Epistemological Dualism ◽  
The Way

AbstractWhat are the proper objects of perception? Two famous responses to this question hold that they are either the images of extramental objects, that is, the way in which they appear to us (representationalism), or they are the objects themselves (direct realism). In this paper, I present an analysis of this issue by Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī (d. 1164/65), a post-Avicennian scholar whose impact on the history of Islamic philosophy has been largely neglected. Abū l-Barakāt argued against the traditional Aristotelian-Avicennian epistemological dualism, which distinguishes between the sense-perception of material particulars and the conception of immaterial universals in terms of the perceiver  and/or  the  structure  of  perception.  In  Abū  l-Barakāt's  own  theory, all epistemic acts have the unified structure of direct relation between one and the same perceiver (immaterial soul) and the objects themselves – both material and immaterial. His main thesis is that having corporeal organs is not necessary for sense-perception. In the final section of the paper, I show that Abū l-Barakāt's critique of the Aristotelian-Avicennian tradition was received as a breakthrough in epistemology. It may have also determined the epistemological theories of two of the most important post-Avicennian Islamic philosophers: Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) and Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191).

Epistemological Dualism vs. Metaphysical Dualism

1921 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 482
Author(s):  
R. W. Sellars
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Dualism

The Virtue of Epistemological Dualism

Philosophia ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 681-693
Author(s):  
Simona Chiodo
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Dualism

Representations and scientific realism

EPISTEMOLOGIA ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 13-29
Author(s):  
Evandro Agazzi
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Mathematical Representations ◽  
Scientific Representations ◽  
Epistemological Dualism ◽  
Operational Criteria ◽  
Sense And Reference ◽  
Physical Phenomena

When it is spoken of scientific representations it is often understood that science can offer "only" representations but does not enable us to know reality. This tenet is the inheritance of a gratuitous and inconsistent presupposition that affected modern philosophy during almost two centuries, according to which we know our representations and not things, and we have to find warranties in order to believe that such representations correspond to reality (epistemological dualism). The present paper analyzes this presupposition, shows its inconsistency and, through a discourse regarding the relations between thought and ontology, between sense and reference of the intellectual constructions, between abstract encoding of properties and concrete exemplification of the same by means of operational criteria of reference, justifies the cognitive purport of scientific representations, including the mathematical representations of physical phenomena.

II.—LINGUISTIC AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM

Mind ◽  
1953 ◽  
Vol LXII (245) ◽  
pp. 20-42
Author(s):  
JOHN W. YOLTON
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Dualism

Epistemological Dualism and the Partition

1963 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 511
Author(s):  
V. J. McGill
Keyword(s):  
Epistemological Dualism

Perceptual Theory and Epistemological Dualism: Some Examples from Experimental Psychology

1972 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Tibbetts
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Perceptual Theory ◽  
Epistemological Dualism
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