The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy.

1987 ◽  
Vol 97 (385) ◽  
pp. 274
Author(s):  
Robert Sudgen ◽  
Geoffrey Brennan ◽  
James M. Buchanan
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy

scholarly journals The rule of rules

Public Choice ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Hamlin
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Rule Based

AbstractRules are central to the constitutional political economy (CPE) approach. On this approach, rules, of a variety of types and forms, are necessary for the emergence of a political and social order, so that all genuine political order is rule-based. The central role of rules within the CPE approach is examined starting from an explicit definitional discussion of the concept of a rule and including discussion of the nature of rule-following behavior, the supply of rules, and rule enforcement.

Volksabstimmungen, Verhandlungen und der Schleier der Insignifikanz

1993 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Baurmann ◽  
Hartmut Kliemt
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Discourse Theory ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
The Veil

AbstractTo combine some views of 'Diskursethik' and Constitutional Political Economy seems to be promising. In our comments on Frey's and Kirchgässner's attempt to join the forces of Discourse theory and Political Economy in defending the wider spread use of referenda we direct attention to three points. Firstly, the normative basis of both concepts is unsettled. Secondly, an economic approach contrary to the supposition of Frey and Kirchgässner provides substantial insights into the processes which precede collective decisions. Thirdly, the 'veil of insignificance' in referenda will not necessarily increase altruism in voting behavior.

scholarly journals Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Otto Lehto ◽  
John Meadowcroft
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Welfare States ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy ◽  
Welfare Systems ◽  
Future Task ◽  
Negative Income Tax

AbstractIn a number of works, James M. Buchanan set out a proposal for a ‘demogrant’—a form of universal basic income that applied the principles of generality and non discrimination to the tax and the transfer sides of the scheme and was to be implemented as a constitutional rule outside the realm of day-to-day politics. The demogrant has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, but this article locates it in Buchanan’s broader constitutional political economy project and shows it was a logical application of his theoretical framework to the problem of inefficient and unfair welfare systems when reform to the basic institutions of majoritarian democracy was not forthcoming. The demogrant aims to end the problems of majority cycling and rent seeking that plague contemporary welfare states and therefore offers a model of welfare without rent seeking—a constitutional welfare state. We compare Buchanan’s demogrant model to other universal basic income and negative income tax models and consider the most important criticisms. We conclude that rescuing the demogrant model from relative obscurity would be a fruitful future task of applied constitutional political economy and public choice.

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