Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation and Nepal’s Loktantra Since 2017

Despite frequent political changes, democratic consolidation is not a popular question among the researchers of democracy in Nepal. This article aims to connect the theoretical discussion of consolidation of democracy, mostly focusing on the structural factors and Nepali Loktantra. Two findings of this study are particularly important for the discussion of the consolidation of Loktantra in Nepal. First, the macro structural factors – e.g., economic modernization, regime type, and party -system – make pessimistic predictions on future of Nepali democracy. In other words, the macro structural conditions are unfavorable for the consolidation of the democracy in contemporary Nepal. Second, procedural dimensions of the democracy are insufficient to define Nepali Loktantra. The newly adopted regime has attempted to merge few components of non-majoritarian democracy too. We need more critical evaluation on the characteristics of Nepali Loktantra. If it is different with a procedural democracy, its relation with socio-economic structure also should be different.

THE PAKISTAN MOVEMENT AND FEDERALISM

The careful reading of the history of Pakistan movement tells us the movement rose in response to the fear of the imposition of majoritarian- unitary democracy model in British India following the West Minister model. After 1857 war of independence, Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan had advised Muslims not to take part in politics and focus their energies on acquiring modern education and hence securing their due share in bureaucratic positions under the British rule. But when Congress was formed in 1885 and gradually democratic reforms were introduced, the fear of majoritarian-unitary model started creeping in among the Muslim elite. The leaders of Muslim League felt if the Westminster style majoritarian- unitary democracy model is introduced in British India that will ultimately bring over the centralized Congress rule in British India which they equated as the Hindu raj. The debate around the federal question remained on top of the agenda in British India since the announcement of the Nehru report in 1928. The failure of the Congress in addressing Muslim concerns regarding majoritarian- unitary democracy model ultimately led to the partition of India in 1947. In this paper the debate around the federal question and the demands for consociational democracy in Pakistan movement would be studied in detail and it will be analysed how far the failure of addressing the federal question was responsible for the partition of India. Keywords: Majoritarian Democracy, Indo-Pak History, Consociationalism, All India Muslim League, Muslim Separatism

Preobražaji ustavnog prava na početku dvadeset prvog veka

The text analyzes the transformations of constitutional law as a university subject and legal field in France and Europe. It begins with the Enlightenment in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, the evolution of the subject was rather checkered: due to its political nature, constitutional law was abolished and reinstated, depending on the political climate. There was neither a linear development nor consistant content as a university subject. It was first studied as institutional law, but then fell under the auspices of political science, only to be positivized after the establishment of constitutional courts. The term constitution also underwent transformation, no longer confined to merely organizing governance, but ordering all of society. While the field of application of the constitution expanded, it was undermined by strengthening individualism and communitarism. Predicaments also arose regarding the possibility of existence of a constitution without or outside the state, specifically in the context of the European Union. Finally, the text notes that the ideological use of the term democracy obscures the fact that majoritarian democracy might possibly be obsolete, and that other forms of legitimacy are gaining in significance.

Counter-Majoritarian Democracy: Persistent Minorities, Federalism, and the Power of Numbers

The majoritarian conception of democracy implies that counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism—and even representative institutions—are derogations from democracy. The majoritarian conception is mistaken for two reasons. First, it is incoherent: majoritarianism ultimately stands against one of democracy’s core normative commitments—namely, political equality. Second, majoritarianism is premised on a mistaken view of power, which fails to account for the power of numbers and thereby fails to explain the inequality faced by members of persistent minorities. Although strict majority rule serves the democratic values of political agency and equality as interpreted by a set of formal conditions, an adequate conception of power shows why in real-world conditions formal-procedural inequalities, instantiated by counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism, are sometimes required to serve democratic equality.

Preferences for consensus and majoritarian democracy: long- and short-term influences

This article analyzes individuals’ preferences for a consensus or a majoritarian type of democracy. We theorize that variation in these preferences is a function of both institutional learning (long term) and individuals’ position as a political minority or majority (short term). First, as a result of institutional learning, we expect that individuals living in democracies characterized by coalition governments will favor consensus democracy. Conversely, those living in countries characterized by single-party executives will favor majoritarian democracy. Second, we expect that individuals’ position as an electoral minority or majority will affect these beliefs. Those who vote for small parties will favor a consensus democracy, while those who vote for large parties will support a majoritarian system. However, whether institutional learning or individuals’ position as a political minority or majority prevail in influencing these preferences about the ideal model of democracy will be a function of the democratic trajectory of each country. We test these arguments drawing on data from the European Social Survey.

Legal preconditions for majoritarian democracy: The case of Hungary

The Constitution of Hungary promulgated in 2011 and officially called the Fundamental law thoroughly altered the Hungarian constitutional system. Scholars encounter difficulties when attempting to label the new system. While some typologies maintain that despite its illiberalism and populism the new system meets the formal criteria of legality and democracy, others insist that it represents an abuse of democratic constitutionalism. In what follows, I put two rival conceptions of democracy into the main focus to better understand the nature of the Hungarian constitutional system and the competing scholarly positions. First, I briefly introduce the contrast between the majoritarian and what I call the complex conception of democracy. My aim is to demonstrate that even if one subscribes to a majoritarian conception of democracy, certain legal and constitutional preconditions must be fulfilled. In the following sections, I examine the case of Hungary within this theoretical framework. The Hungarian constitutional system presents itself as a winner-takes-all majoritarian democracy. Nevertheless, an analysis of the legal preconditions of democracy - constitutional text, electoral system, legal institutions, fundamental rights, and the rule of law - can demonstrate that in this system, legal mechanisms do not serve to govern the formation of a legitimate majority rule. They create instead an autocratic system, the key attribute of which is the pretence of majoritarian democracy.

Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state

In a number of works, James M. Buchanan set out a proposal for a ‘demogrant’—a form of universal basic income that applied the principles of generality and non discrimination to the tax and the transfer sides of the scheme and was to be implemented as a constitutional rule outside the realm of day-to-day politics. The demogrant has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, but this article locates it in Buchanan’s broader constitutional political economy project and shows it was a logical application of his theoretical framework to the problem of inefficient and unfair welfare systems when reform to the basic institutions of majoritarian democracy was not forthcoming. The demogrant aims to end the problems of majority cycling and rent seeking that plague contemporary welfare states and therefore offers a model of welfare without rent seeking—a constitutional welfare state. We compare Buchanan’s demogrant model to other universal basic income and negative income tax models and consider the most important criticisms. We conclude that rescuing the demogrant model from relative obscurity would be a fruitful future task of applied constitutional political economy and public choice.

Is freedom as non-domination a right-wing idea?

Sean Irving’s book Hayek’s Market Republicanism: The Limits of Liberty shows that the commonly accepted reading of Hayek as a liberal thinker is mistaken, and that his political writings are best understood as belonging to the broader tradition of republicanism. The distinction is important for understanding many aspects of Hayek’s thought, and especially his rejection of social justice and majoritarian democracy. In that sense, one of the book’s more general merits is its implicit contribution to ongoing debates between republican ‘freedom as non-domination’ and liberal ‘freedom as non-interference’. Irving focuses on what he sees as a contradiction between Hayek’s chief concerns about the state as the main source of domination and his disregard for private forms of power, and especially within the capitalist firm. I argue, however, that the example of Hayek should lead us to consider a more prosaic conclusion: freedom as non-domination is a concept less useful for criticising the free market than Irving and left-leaning Republicans seem to assume.