Extending the Curry-Howard interpretation to linear, relevant and other resource logics

1992 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 1319-1365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov M. Gabbay ◽  
Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz

The so-called Curry-Howard interpretation (Curry [1934], Curry and Feys [1958], Howard [1969], Tait [1965]) is known to provide a rather neat term-functional account of intuitionistic implication. Could one refine the interpretation to obtain an almost as good account of other neighbouring implications, including the so-called ‘resource’ implications (e.g. linear, relevant, etc.)?We answer this question positively by demonstrating that just by working with side conditions on the rule of assertability conditions for the connective representing implication (‘→’) one can characterise those ‘resource’ logics. The idea stems from the realisation that whereas the elimination rule for conditionals (of which implication is a particular case) remains virtually unchanged no matter what kind of conditional one has (i.e. linear, relevant, intuitionistic, classical, etc., all have modus ponens), the corresponding introduction rule carries an element of vagueness which can be explored in the characterisation of several sorts of conditionals. The rule of →-introduction is classified as an ‘improper’ inference rule, to use a terminology from Prawitz [1965]. Now, the so-called improper rules leave room for manoeuvre as to how a particular logic can be obtained just by imposing conditions on the discharge of assumptions that would correspond to the particular logical discipline one is adopting (linear, relevant, ticket entailment, intuitionistic, classical, etc.). The side conditions can be ‘naturally’ imposed, given that a degree of ‘vagueness’ is introduced by the presentation of those improper inference rules, such as the rule of →-introduction:which says: starting from assumption ‘A’, and arriving at ‘B’ via an unspecified number of steps, one can discharge the assumption and conclude that ‘A’ implies ‘B’.

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. F. Bausch

The Stoic “indemonstrables” were inference rules; a rule about rules was the synthetic theorem: if from certain premisses a conclusion follows and from that conclusion and certain further premisses a second conclusion follows, then the second conclusion follows from all the premisses together. Similar things occur as medieval “rules of consequence”, although not usually on a metametalevel; and (with the same proviso) the following might be deemed a contemporary avatar of that Stoic theorem.If every formula which occurs once or more often in the list A1, A2, …, An, B1, B2, …, Bm occurs also at least once in the list C1, C2, …, Cr then:This rule [Church: Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 1956, pp. 94, 165], which may be called the rule of modus ponens under hypotheses (MPH), is worthy of attention for the following reasons:A. MPH and the axioms A ⊃ A yield precisely the positive implicative calculus (and very easily, too).B. MPH and the axioms A ⊃ f ⊃ f ⊃ A yield a new formulation of the full classical propositional calculus (in terms of f and ⊃).C. MPH and the axioms ∼A ⊃ A ⊃ A and A ⊃. ∼A ⊃ B yield the classical calculus in terms of ∼ and ⊃.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matheus Pereira Lobo

All nine axioms and a single inference rule of logic (Modus Ponens) within the Hilbert axiomatic system are presented using capital letters (ABC) in order to familiarize the beginner student in hers/his first contact with the topic.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1409
Author(s):  
Marija Boričić Joksimović

We give some simple examples of applying some of the well-known elementary probability theory inequalities and properties in the field of logical argumentation. A probabilistic version of the hypothetical syllogism inference rule is as follows: if propositions A, B, C, A→B, and B→C have probabilities a, b, c, r, and s, respectively, then for probability p of A→C, we have f(a,b,c,r,s)≤p≤g(a,b,c,r,s), for some functions f and g of given parameters. In this paper, after a short overview of known rules related to conjunction and disjunction, we proposed some probabilized forms of the hypothetical syllogism inference rule, with the best possible bounds for the probability of conclusion, covering simultaneously the probabilistic versions of both modus ponens and modus tollens rules, as already considered by Suppes, Hailperin, and Wagner.


1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-715 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krister Segerberg

Let ⊥, →, and □ be primitive, and let us have a countable supply of propositional letters. By a (modal) logic we understand a proper subset of the set of all formulas containing every tautology and being closed under modus ponens and substitution. A logic is regular if it contains every instance of □A ∧ □B ↔ □(A ∧ B) and is closed under the ruleA regular logic is normal if it contains □⊤. The smallest regular logic we denote by C (the same as Lemmon's C2), the smallest normal one by K. If L and L' are logics and L ⊆ L′, then L is a sublogic of L', and L' is an extension of L; properly so if L ≠ L'. A logic is quasi-regular (respectively, quasi-normal) if it is an extension of C (respectively, K).A logic is Post complete if it has no proper extension. The Post number, denoted by p(L), is the number of Post complete extensions of L. Thanks to Lindenbaum, we know thatThere is an obvious upper bound, too:Furthermore,.


1966 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Storrs McCall ◽  
R. K. Meyer

The matrix defining Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic, constructed in 1920 and described at length in [1], is the following: This matrix was axiomatized in 1931 by Wajsberg (see [6]), who showed that the following axioms together with the rules of substitution and modus ponens were sufficient:


1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Edmonds
Keyword(s):  

Rose has shown in [2] that the following axioms are sufficient, with modus ponens, for m-valued Łukasiewiczian implication.


1958 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 417-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. L. Goodstein

Mr. L. J. Cohen's interesting example of a logical truth of indirect discourse appears to be capable of a simple formalisation and proof in a variant of first order predicate calculus. His example has the form:If A says that anything which B says is false, and B says that something which A says is true, then something which A says is false and something which B says is true.Let ‘A says x’ be formalised by ‘A(x)’ and let assertions of truth and falsehood be formalised as in the following table.We treat both variables x and predicates A (x) as sentences and add to the familiar axioms and inference rules of predicate logic a rule permitting the inference of A(p) from (x)A(x), where p is a closed sentence.We have to prove that from


Author(s):  
Tobias Boege

AbstractThe gaussoid axioms are conditional independence inference rules which characterize regular Gaussian CI structures over a three-element ground set. It is known that no finite set of inference rules completely describes regular Gaussian CI as the ground set grows. In this article we show that the gaussoid axioms logically imply every inference rule of at most two antecedents which is valid for regular Gaussians over any ground set. The proof is accomplished by exhibiting for each inclusion-minimal gaussoid extension of at most two CI statements a regular Gaussian realization. Moreover we prove that all those gaussoids have rational positive-definite realizations inside every ε-ball around the identity matrix. For the proof we introduce the concept of algebraic Gaussians over arbitrary fields and of positive Gaussians over ordered fields and obtain the same two-antecedental completeness of the gaussoid axioms for algebraic and positive Gaussians over all fields of characteristic zero as a byproduct.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-282
Author(s):  
Andrew Schumann

Abstract In this paper, I show that we can find some foundations of logic and legal argumentation in the tablets of Mesopotamia at least since the dynasty of Ur III. In these texts, we see the oldest correct application of logical inference rules (e.g. modus ponens). As concerns the legal argumentation established in Mesopotamia, we can reconstruct on the basis of the tablets the following rules of dispute resolutions during trials: (1) There are two parties of disputants: (i) a protagonist who formulates a standpoint and (ii) an antagonist who disagrees with the protagonist’s standpoint and formulates an alternative statement. (2) There is a rational judge represented by high-ranking citizens who should follow only logical conclusions from facts and law articles as premises.


2020 ◽  
pp. 21-52
Author(s):  
Jared Warren

What are linguistic conventions? This chapter begins by noting and setting aside philosophical accounts of social conventions stemming from Lewis’s influential treatment. It then criticizes accounts that see conventions as explicit stipulations. From there the chapter argues that conventions are syntactic rules of inference, arguing that there are scientific reasons to posit these rules as part of our linguistic competence and that we need to include both bilateralist and open-ended inference rules for a full account. The back half of the chapter aims to naturalize inference rule-following by providing functionalist-dispositionalist approaches to our attitudes, inference, and inference-rule–following, addressing Kripkenstein’s arguments and several other concerns along the way.


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