On the Possibility of "Fair" Collective Choice Rule

This essay is part of a larger project exploring the extent to which the market paradigm might be usefully employed to explain and in some instances justify nonmarket institutions. The focus of the market paradigm in this essay is the relationship between the idea of a perfectly competitive market and aspects of both the rationality of political association and the theory of collective choice. In particular, this essay seeks to identify what connections, if any, exist between one kind of market account of the rationality of political association and one kind of market-based social choice rule. The market theory of political association I intend to discuss I call “market contractarianism,” and the collective choice rule whose relation to it I intend to explore is the unanimity rule. What, if anything, is the relationship between market contractarianism and the unanimity rule?

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Collective Choice

10.1007/978-3-540-24711-1 ◽

2003 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Keyword(s):

Collective Choice

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Graphical Models and Collective Choice

10.21236/ada438432 ◽

2005 ◽

Author(s):

Whitman Richards

Keyword(s):

Graphical Models ◽

Collective Choice

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Expert Communication in Collective Choice Environments

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2258857 ◽

2013 ◽

Author(s):

Keith E. Schnakenberg

Keyword(s):

Collective Choice

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LIBERALISM AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE: A RETURN TO REALITY?

Manchester School ◽

10.1111/j.1467-9957.1978.tb00165.x ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 46 (3) ◽

pp. 224-251 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

CHARLES K. ROWLEY

Keyword(s):

Collective Choice

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Collective Choice and Mutual Knowledge Structures

Advances in Complex Systems ◽

10.1142/s0219525998000156 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 01 (02n03) ◽

pp. 221-236 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Diana Richards ◽

Brendan D. McKay ◽

Whitman A. Richards

Keyword(s):

Complex System ◽

Social Choice ◽

Group Decision ◽

Knowledge Structure ◽

Collective Choice ◽

Sense Data ◽

Mutual Knowledge ◽

Interacting Agents ◽

Aggregation Of Information ◽

Domain Independent

The conditions under which the aggregation of information from interacting agents results in a stable or an unstable collective outcome is an important puzzle in the study of complex systems. We show that if a complex system of aggregated choice respects a mutual knowledge structure, then the prospects of a stable collective outcome are considerably improved. Our domain-independent results apply to collective choice ranging from perception, where an interpretation of sense data is made by a collection of perceptual modules, to social choice, where a group decision is made from a set of preferences held by individuals.

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