A consensus solution for the taxation of the digital economy

The taxation of the digital economy is not a new subject but its fast development demands a solid solution for this new way of doing business and generating profit and growth. The solution for this problem should be achieved at a global level, which has turned out to be a complex task. Therefore, the work we aim to do here is to identify and expose the path that has been followed by the international community (in general), and by the European Union, in particular, for the taxation of profits of companies with a significant digital presence and to what extent the lack of an unambiguous solution, within the Union, may condition its own objectives. But achieving a consensual solution comes with a bigger problem: is the unanimity rule established for tax policies, where decisions are taken by a special legislative procedure, suited for the European Union’s goal for a strong and dynamic single market, capable of competing with the world’s leading economies?

Voting Rules in Sequential Search by Committees: Theory and Experiments

We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the “secretary problem,” where collective decisions on when to stop the search are reached via a prespecified voting rule. We offer a game-theoretic analysis of our model and then report two experiments on three-person committees with either uncorrelated or perfectly correlated preferences under three different voting rules followed by a third experiment on single decision makers. Relative to equilibrium predictions, committees with uncorrelated preferences oversearched under minority and majority voting rules but, otherwise, undersearched or approximated equilibrium play. Individually, committee members were often less strategic when their preferences were uncorrelated than when they were perfectly correlated. Collectively, committees’ decisions were more strategic than single decision makers’ only under the unanimity rule, although still not significantly better in terms of the decision makers’ welfare. Finally, across our experiments that involved committee search, the unanimity rule always optimized committee welfare. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.

Article 45 TEU

As already discussed, Articles 42(3) second subparagraph second sentence and 45 TEU provide for the establishment of a EDA. The EDA has been in existence since 2004. However, after the new TEU provisions entered into force, the Council in accordance with Article 45(2) second sentence TEU repealed the previous act establishing the EDA and adopted a new decision defining the statute, seat, and operational rules of the EDA. As an exception to the unanimity rule applicable to CSDP decisions, Article 45(2) second sentence TEU provides for the EDA Decision to be adopted by qualified majority.

Voting

Chapter 3 analyses electoral assemblies with a focus on voting principles and procedures. It argues that the two countries’ voting practices, while seemingly chaotic, reflected the values, priorities, and immediate circumstances of each electorate. In Poland-Lithuania, politics was seen as a communal, public, and hands-on affair, where debate, negotiation, and persuasion trumped efficiency and speed. Those principles were reflected in the preference for voting in person rather than by electors, and what would later be known as the unanimity rule. In Transylvania, where the majority rule was used and voting was done by delegates, speed and efficiency prevailed mainly due to a constant sense of being under threat. The chapter analyses the theory and practice of consensus and gives an overview of voting methods in the two countries against a broader European background. To illustrate these points, the elections of 1571 (Transylvania) and 1575 (Poland-Lithuania) are analysed in detail.

REASONABLE DOUBT AND DISAGREEMENT

ABSTRACTThe right to trial by jury and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are two of the most fundamental commitments of American criminal law. This article asks how the two are related, that is, whether disagreement among jurors implies anything about whether the beyond a reasonable doubt standard has been satisfied: Does the due process requirement of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard also require jury unanimity in criminal cases? Drawing on literature about the epistemological significance of disagreement, this article considers the “equal-weight view” and its implications for the unanimity rule in criminal jury decision-making. The equal-weight view says that, roughly speaking, when people disagree on a topic, each view should be given equal weight. This implies, this article concludes, that the unanimity rule is required as a way of enforcing the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement. This article further concludes, however, that jurors should not always be instructed to apply the equal-weight view in their deliberation. Jurors, when applying crime definitions to particular cases, make determinations about both historical facts and normative issues through moral terms like “reckless,” “unjustifiable,” “depraved,” “cruel,” and “heinous,” which are common in criminal law. This article argues that while the equal-weight view should guide the jurors in determining factual issues, it is not the correct model for moral issues, not only because it would imply that acquittals are appropriate in many cases involving controversial moral questions but also because having the jurors follow it would undermine the basic justification for having the criminal jury as an articulator and enforcer of morality.