Market Contractarianism and the Unanimity Rule

This essay is part of a larger project exploring the extent to which the market paradigm might be usefully employed to explain and in some instances justify nonmarket institutions. The focus of the market paradigm in this essay is the relationship between the idea of a perfectly competitive market and aspects of both the rationality of political association and the theory of collective choice. In particular, this essay seeks to identify what connections, if any, exist between one kind of market account of the rationality of political association and one kind of market-based social choice rule. The market theory of political association I intend to discuss I call “market contractarianism,” and the collective choice rule whose relation to it I intend to explore is the unanimity rule. What, if anything, is the relationship between market contractarianism and the unanimity rule?

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A general collective choice rule in group decision making under fuzzy preferences and fuzzy majority: an OWA operator based approach

2002 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence. 2002 IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems. FUZZ-IEEE'02. Proceedings (Cat. No.02CH37291) ◽

10.1109/fuzz.2002.1006688 ◽

2003 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

J. Kacprzyk ◽

S. Zadrozny

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Group Decision Making ◽

Group Decision ◽

Collective Choice ◽

Choice Rule ◽

Owa Operator ◽

Fuzzy Preferences ◽

Collective Choice Rule

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Three Social Choice Rules

Applied Behavioral Economics Research and Trends - Advances in Finance, Accounting, and Economics ◽

10.4018/978-1-5225-1826-6.ch004 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 54-71

Author(s):

Andrei Marius Vlăducu

Keyword(s):

Social Choice ◽

Status Quo ◽

Choice Rule ◽

Borda Count ◽

Social Choice Rule ◽

Status Quo Bias ◽

Approval Voting ◽

The People ◽

Viable Solution ◽

Social Choice Rules

The authors analyze three social choice rules (plurality voting, approval voting and Borda count) from a behavioral economics perspective aiming three objectives: 1) if it is a viable solution to use these procedures during mass elections; 2) why individuals prefer a specific social choice rule and not another; 3) how status quo bias and framing effect influence the preference of individuals for a certain social choice rule. The research is conducted with 87 participants to a lab experiment and data suggest that for using approval voting and Borda count during mass elections is necessary to increase the people level of information about their benefits. When making a decision in a political or economic context seem that people tend to prefer simple plurality rule do to its availability and maybe because of its strong reliance with status quo bias.

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