Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Cristina Molinari
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Information Games

Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games.

scholarly journals Concession Stands: How Mining Investments Incite Protest in Africa

2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darin Christensen
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Foreign Investment ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Commodity Prices ◽  
Mineral Resources ◽  
Environmental Harm ◽  
Common Cause ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractForeign investment in Africa's mineral resources has increased dramatically. This paper addresses three questions raised by this trend: do commercial mining investments increase the likelihood of social or armed conflict? If so, when are these disputes most prevalent? And, finally, what mechanisms help explain these conflicts? I show, first, that mining has contrasting effects on social and armed conflict: while the probability of protests or riots increases (roughly doubling) after mining starts, there is no increase in rebel activity. Second, I show that the probability of social conflict rises with plausibly exogenous increases in world commodity prices. Finally, I compile additional geo-spatial and survey data to explore potential mechanisms, including reporting bias, environmental harm, in-migration, inequality, and governance. Finding little evidence consistent with these accounts, I develop an explanation related to incomplete information—a common cause of conflict in industrial and international relations. This mechanism rationalizes why mining induces protest, why these conflicts are exacerbated by rising prices, and why transparency dampens the relationship between prices and protest.

Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Esarey ◽  
Bumba Mukherjee ◽  
Will H. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Statistical Treatment ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Information Characteristics ◽  
Information Games

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.

scholarly journals A systematic procedure for finding Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Munoz-Garcia
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Systematic Procedure ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Step Procedure ◽  
Information Games

Abstract This paper provides a non-technical introduction to a procedure to find Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) in incomplete information games. Despite the rapidly expanding literature on industrial organization that uses PBE as its main solution concept, most undergraduate and graduate textbooks still present a relatively theoretical introduction to PBEs. This paper offers a systematic five-step procedure that helps students find all pure-strategy PBEs in incomplete information games. Furthermore, it illustrates a step-by-step application of this procedure to a signaling game, using a worked-out example.

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